Supreme Court of India
Maharaj Singh vs State Of Uttar Pradesh & Others on 2 November, 1976
Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 2602, 1977 SCR (1)1072
Author: V Krishnaiyer
Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R.
           PETITIONER:
MAHARAJ SINGH

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/11/1976

BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:
 1976 AIR 2602		  1977 SCR  (1)1072
 1977 SCC  (1) 155


ACT:
	    U.P.   Zamindari   Abolition   &   Land   Reforms	Act,
	1950--Section  117--Scope  of--State  vests  lands  in	Gaon
	Sabha--Suit    for    ejectment--Gaon	 Sabha	  did	 not
	appeal-State--If had locus standi.
	Words & phrases--Vest Person  aggrieved--Appurtenance--Mean-
	ing of



HEADNOTE:
	    By virtue of s. 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land
	Reforms	 Act, 1950, the right, title and interest of all the
	intermediaries	in every estate including hats,	 bazars	 and
	melas  stood terminated and vested absolutely in the  State.
	Section	 9 provides' that all wells, trees in abadi and	 all
	buildings situate within the limits of an Estate,  belonging
	to  an intermediary, shall continue to belong to or be	held
	by such intermediary and the site  of  the  buildings  which
	is  appurtenant thereto, shall be deemed to be settled	with
	him  by the State Government.  Section 117(1)  empowers	 the
	State  Government to  vest  lands  in Gaon Sabhas  or  other
	local  authorities.  Under s. 117(6) the  State	  Government
	has  power to resume from a Gaon Sabha the lands  vested  in
	it.  By a notification under s. 117(1 ) the State Government
	vested the land in the village in the Gaon Sabha.
	    On	the  estate in dispute, the defendant  who  was	 the
	quondam	 zamindar, had been conducting a cattle	 fair.	 The
	estate	had  on	 it, among others, a  few  structures.	 The
	plaintiffs'  (the State and the Gaon Sabha) suit for  eject-
	ment  of the defendant from the estate was dismissed by	 the
	trial  court.  The Gaon Sabha, however, did not appeal;	 but
	the  State  went in appeal to the High Court  as  'a  person
	aggrieved'.  The High Court negatived the defendants conten-
	tions  that as a result of the notification under s.  117(1)
	the  land  having   vested  in	the Gaon  Sabha,  the  State
	Government had no locus standi and that it was not a  person
	aggrieved, but allowed the defendant to keep all the  struc-
	tures  and  a space of 5 yards running round each building.
	Dismissing the appeal,
	    HELD: (1) The State has title to sustain the action	  in
	ejectment.   The Government, despite vesting the estates  in
	Gaon  Sabhas has, and continues to have, a constant hold  on
	these  estates,	 when it chooses, to take away what  it	 had
	given  possession  of  to a Gaon  Sabha.   This	 is  plainly
	'present  legal	 interest' in the Government and a  sort  of
	precarium  tenans in the  Sabha.  [1082 D; 1079 F-G]
	    (a)	 The Act contemplates taking over of  all  zamindari
	rights	as  part of land reform.   Instead  of	centralising
	management of all estates at State  level,  the Act gives an
	enabling  power	 to make over these states to  Gaon  Sabhas.
	Apart  from management, no power is expressly vested in	 the
	Sabhas	to dispose of the estates absolutely.  If the  State
	thinks	fit to amend or cancel the earlier vesting  declara-
	tion  or notification it can totally deprive the  Sabha	 of,
	and  resume from it, any estate.  The vesting in  the  State
	was absolute but the  vesting  in  the Sabha was limited  to
	possession  and	 management  subject   to   divestiture	  by
	Government.  Such a construction of vesting in two different
	senses in the same section is sound because the word  'vest'
	has many meanings.  The sense of the situation suggests that
	in s. 117(1) 'vested in the State' carries a plenary  conno-
	tation,	 while	'shall	vest in the Gaon  Sabha'  imports  a
	qualified disposition confined to the right to full  posses-
	sion  and  enjoyment so long  as  it  lasts.   To  postulate
	vesting of absolute title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the
	declaration under s. 117(1) is to stultify s. 117(6).  [1081
	A-C; F-G]
	1073
	    (b)	 The State is 'a person aggrieved'.  He, who  has  a
	proprietary   right,  which  has been or  is  threatened  by
	violation, is an 'aggrieved person'.  The right to a  remedy
	apart, a larger circle of persons can move the court for the
	protection of defence or enforcement of a civil right or  to
	ward  off or claim compensation for a civil wrong,  even  if
	they are not  proprietarily  or	 personally linked with	 the
	cause  of action.  The nexus between the lis and the  plain-
	tiff  need not necessarily be personal.	 A person  aggrieved
	is  an expression which has expanded with the larger  urgen-
	cies and felt necessities of our time. [1082 E-F]
	    (c)	 The  amplitude of 'legal grievance'  has  broadened
	with social compulsions.  The State undertakes today activi-
	ties whose beneficiaries may  be  the general community even
	though	the legal right to the, undertaking may not vest  in
	the  community.	  The State starts  welfare  projects  whose
	effective implementation may call for collective action from
	the  protected	group or any member of	them.	Test  suits,
	class  actions and representative litigation are the  begin-
	ning and the horizon is expanding with persons and   organi-
	sations	  not  personally injured but vicariously  concerned
	being  entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court	 for
	redressal of actual or imminent wrongs. [1083 A-C]
	Dhabolkar [1976] 1 S.C.R. 306 followed.
	'Locus standi' has a larger ambit in current legal semantics
	than  the  accepted, individualistic jurisprudence  of	old.
	Therefore,  the State, in the present case, is	entitled  to
	appeal	under s. 96 of the= Code. of Civil Procedure.  [1084
	D]
	     (2)  Where a wrong against community interest is  done,
	'no  locus standi' will not always be a plea to non-suit  an
	interested  public body chasing the wrongdoer in court.	  In
	the  instant case the Government is the 'aggrieved  person'.
	Its  right  of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, meant  to  be
	exercised  in  public interest will be seriously jeopardised
	if  the	 estate slips into the hands of a  trespasser.	 The
	estate	belonged to the State, is vested in the	 Gaon  Sabha
	for  community benefit, is controlled by the  State  through
	directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to
	be  divested.  The wholesome object  of	 the legislature  of
	cautiously  decentralised vesting of estates in local  self-
	governing units will be frustrated, if the State is to be  a
	helpless spectator of its purposeful bounty being wasted  or
	lost. [1083 H; 1084 A-B]
	    (3)(a) The touchstone of 'appurtenance' is dependence of
	the  building  on  what appertains to it for its  use  as  a
	building.   Obviously  the hat,	 bazar,	 or mela is  not  an
	appurtenance  to the building.	Even if the  buildings	were
	used  and  enjoyed  in the past	 with  the  whole.  st.retch
	of.vacant space for a hat or mela, the land is not  appurte-
	nant  to  the principal subject granted by s.	9,   namely,
	buildings. [1085 G]
	   (b)	The larger objective of s. 9 is to settle  with	 the
	former	intermediary only such land as is strictly  appurte-
	nant  to  buildings, all the rest going to  the	 State.	 for
	implementation of the agrarian reform policy. [1084 G]
	       (c)  The	 large open spaces cannot ,be  regarded	  as
	appurtenant  to	 the terraces, stands and structures.	What
	a  integral  is not necessarily appurtenant. A	position  of
	subordination, something incidental or ancillary or  depend-
	ent is implied in appurtenance.	 That much of space required
	for  the  use  of  the structures as such has been  excluded
	by  the High Court  itself.  Beyond  that may or may not  be
	necessary  for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment  of
	the chabutras as such. [1085  B-C]
	    (d)	 'Appurtenance' in relation to a dwelling,  includes
	all land occupied therewith and used for the purposes there-
	of.   The word 'appurtenances' has a distinct  and  definite
	meaning.   Prima facie it imports nothing more than what  is
	strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or
	grant.	 What  is necessary for the enjoyment and  has	been
	used  for  the purpose of the building,	 such  as  easement,
	alone  will  be appurtenant.  The. word	 'appurtenance'	 in-
	cludes	all  the incorporeal hereditaments attached  to	 the
	land granted or demised such as rights of way, but does	 not
	include lands in addition to that granted. [1086 D-E]
	    (e)	 What  the High Court has granted viz., 5  yards  of
	surrounding space is sound in law. [1086 H]
	1074



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1976. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-5-1975 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 392/ 64.

Shana Bhushan, V.P. Goel and Subodh Markendeya, for the Appellant.

L.N. Sinha, Solicitor-General of India and O.P. Rana, for the Respondent No. 1.

Bal Kishan Gaur and Amlan Ghosh, for Respondent No. 2. Yogeshwar Prasad and Rani Arora, for Respondent No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.–Two principal submissions, whose implications’ perhaps are of profound moment and have public impact, have been, at wide-ranging length, urged in this appeal by certificate, by Shri Shanti Bhushan, for the appellant/defendant and, with effective brevity, controvert- ed by the Solicitor General, for respondent/1st plaintiff. The two focal points of the controversy are: (a) Is the appeal to the High Court by the State 1st plaintiff at all competent, entitlement as a ‘party aggrieved’ being absent, having regard to the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Aboli- tion and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act 1 of 1951) (for short, the Act) ?; and (b) Is it sound to conceptualise ‘area appurtenant to buildings’ in s. 9 of the Act so nar- rowly as has been’ done by the High Court ? There were two plaintiffs–the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Gaon Sabha of Bedpura claiming common but alternative reliefs. The suit was for injunction or ejectment, on title, of the sole defendant who was the quondam zamindar of the ‘estate’ which is the ‘subject matter of the suit. The trial Court dis- missed the suit whereupon the 2nd plaintiff dropped out of the litigation, as it were, and the State alone pursued the matter by way of appeal against the decree. The High Court partially allowed the appeal and the aggrieved defendant is the appellant before us.

An expose of the facts may now be given to the extent necessary for explaining the setting of the contention between the parties. The State of Uttar Pradesh extin- guished all zamindari estates by the Act and implemented a scheme of settlement of lands with intermediaries, tenants and others by first vesting all estates in the State and empowering it to vest, divest and re-vest flora time to time according to flexible needs and ad hoc requirements, the same estate’s in Gaon Sabhas or other local authorities. Settlement of trees, buildings and other specified items in the intermediaries was also part of the agrarian reform. A skeletal picture of the legislation may now be projected. But, before that, a short sketch of the actual dispute may illumine the further discussion.

The suit lands were part of an estate owned and.pos- sessed by the defendant-zamindarini. The statutory conse- quence of the abolition of all zamindaris by force of s. 4 is spelt out in s. 6, to wit, thecesser of the ownership of the zamindar and vesting of title and possession in the State. By a notification under s. 117(1) of the Act the area of lands was vested by the State in the 2nd plaintiff Gaon Sabha. The legislative nullifica- tion notwithstanding, the defendant who had been conducting a lucrative bi-weekly cattle fair, the best in the district, persisted in this profitable adventure strengthened by s. 9 of the Act which settles in the intermediary all buildings and area appurtenant thereto. This resulted in possessory disputes between the Gaon Sabha and the defendant–proceed- ings under s. 145upholding the latter’s possession and the present suit for declaration of title and consequential injunction or ejectment.

The estate, which is the site of the rural cattle mar- ket, has a large number of trees on it, a temple in one plot, a (veterinary) clinic in another and quite a number of cattle stands and other auxiliary structures which are facilities for the bovine display and transaction of business. Taking advantage of the provisions of the Act, the defendant successfully claimed before the High Court that the trees and the two plots with the shrine and the oushadhalaya should be deemed to have been settled with her. Her ambitious demand, based on some provisions which we will presently X-ray more carefully, was that the entire estate with all the buildings thereon was enjoyed as a unum quid and th.e vacant lands were as much necessary for the mean- ingful running of the cattle fair as the structures them- selves. To dissect and detach the buildings from the vacant spaces was to destroy the functional wholeness of the serv- ice rendered. In short, the large intervening areas sur- rounding the chabutras and other edifices were essential adjuncts or appurtenant lands which, together in their original entirety, should be settled under s. 9 of the Act with the erstwhile intermediary viz., the defendant. The High Court declined to go the whole hog with the defendant but granted the plea to the limited degree of giving all the structures and a space of 5 yards running round each ‘build- ing’. In the view of the Court hats, bazars, and melas could not be held by a private owner under the scheme of the Act and reliance on the conduct of the cattle market as an indicator of ‘appurtenant’ area was, therefore, impermissi- ble. The suit was decreed pro tanto.

The Gaon Sabha, when defeated in the trial Court, discreetly stepped out of the risks of an appeal but the Government, first plaintiff, claiming to be gravely ag- grieved, challenged the dismissal of the suit and was faced with the plea that the land having vested in the Gaon Sabha, on the issue of the notification under s. 117 (1 ) of the Act, .the State had no surviving interest in the property and, therefore, forfeited the position of a person ag- grieved, who alone could competently appeal against a de- cree. This contention, negatived by the High Court. has been reiterated before us with resourceful embellishments and that, logically, is the first question of law falling for our decision and is the piece de resistance, if we may say so, in this appeal. If the 1st plaintiff’s entire interests, by subsequent plenary vesting in the 2nd plain- tiff, have perished, the former cannot, as of right, appeal under s. 96 C.P.C. Survival after death is unknown to real property law and suits, without at least apprehended injury, are beyond the ken of the procedural law. To put it in a nutshell, has the State current interest in the estate, sufficient to sustain an appeal ?

The anatomy of the Act, so far as this dispute is con- cerned, needs to be’ set out and alongside thereof, the exercises in statutory construction necessary to resolve the two legal disputes. The Act had for its primary object, as testified by its Preamble, the extinction of intermediary rights viz., zamindaris and the like. The goal of the legislation must make its presence felt while the judicial choice of meanings of words of ambiguous import or plurality of significations is made. Section 4 is the foundational provision, the very title deed of the State; and it runs, to read:

“s. 4. Vesting of estates in the State.– (1 ) As soon as may be after the commence- ment of this Act, the State Government may, by notification, declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estate situate in the Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified (herin- after called the date of vesting), all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest except as hereinafter provided, in the State free from all encumbrances.

(2) It shall be lawful for the State Government, if it so considers necessary, to issue, from time to time, the notification referred to in sub-section (1) in respect only of such area or areas as may be specified and all the provisions of sub-section (1), shall be applicable to. and in the case of every such notification.”

Section 6 sets out the legal consequences of such vesting more specifically. We may extract the provision:

“6. Consequences of the vesting of an estate in the State.–

When the notification under section 4 has been published in the Gazette then, notwith- standing anything contained in any contract or document or in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequences as hereinafter set forth shall, from the begining of the date of vesting, ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely–

(a) all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries–

(i) in every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren), grove-land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water-channels, fernes, pathways, abadi sites, hats, bazars and meals other than hats, bazars and melas held upon land to which clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 apply, and

(ii) in all sub-soil in such estates including rights, if any in mines and miner- als, whether being worked or not; shall ‘cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances;

* * * * Reading the two sister sections together, certain clear conclusions emerge. Emphatically, three things happened on the coming into force of the Act. By virtue of s. 4the right, title and interest of all intermediaries in every estate, including hats, bazars and melas, stood terminated.

Secondly, this whole bundle of interests came to be vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, the quality of the vesting being absolute. ‘Thirdly, one and only one species of property in hats, bazars and melas was expressly excluded from the total vesting of estates in the State, viz., such as had been held on lands to which s. 18(1)(a) to (c) ap- plied. Section 9, at this stage, needs to be read since it is geared to the nationalisation of zamindaris by providing for settlement, under the State, of some kind’s of landed interests in existing owners or occupiers. Section 9 states:

“Private wells, trees in abadi and buildings to be settled with the existing owners or occupiers thereof–

All wells, trees in abadi, and all build- ings situate within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person, whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to. or be held by such intermediary, tenant or persons, as the case may be,, and the site, of the wells or the buildings which are appurte- nant thereto: shall be. deemed to. be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed”

A close-up of this section is called for since the basic plank of the defendant’s case is the claim to the whole set of plots as building and appurtenant area of land statutori- ly settled with her. If she is such a settlee, the substan- tive merit of the plaintiff’s title fails. We will examine this aspect after a survey of the sections relevant to the locus standi of the State is done. So we shift to Chapter VII which relates to Gaon Sabhas vesting by the State of resumed estates in them and the limitations and other conditions to which it is subject. Attributed legal personality by s.3, the Gaon Sabhas are bodies corporate which, under the various provisions of Chapter VII, have been invested with legal viability right to own and hold property, to transfer and otherwise deal with movables and immovables and manage their landed assets through the executive agency of Land Management Com- mittees. This comprehensive ‘proprietary personality of the Sabha is indisputable but unhelpful for our purpose.

The controversy before us comes into focus when we read s. 117 (1), (2) and (6), all the limbs being taken as belong- ing to a legally living corporate body. Section 117, cls. (1) and (2), provide:

“117. Vesting of certain lands etc., in Gaon Shabhas and other local authorities.– (1 ) At any time after the publication of the notification referred to in Section 4, the State Government may, by general or special order to be published in the manner pre- scribed, declare that as from a date to be specified in this behalf, all or any of the following things, namely–

* * * * *

(v) hats, bazars and melas except hats, bazars, and melas held on land to which, the provisions of clauses (a) to (c) of sub-sec-

tion (1) of section 18 apply or on sites and areas referred to in section 9, and * * * * * which had vested in the State under this Act shall vest in the Gaon Sabhas or and other local authority established t.or the whole or part of the village in which the said things are situate, or partly in one such local authority (including a Gaon Sabha) and partly in another:

Provided that it shall be lawful for the State Govern- ment to make the declaration aforesaid subject to such exceptions and conditions as may be specified in the notifi- cation.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law’ for the time being in force, the State Government may, by general or special order to be published in the manner prescribed in the Gazette, declare that as from a date to be specified in this behalf, all or any of the things specified in clauses (i) to (vi) of sub-section (1) which alter their vesting in the State under this Act had been vested in a Gaon Sabha or any other local authority, either under this Act or under section 126 of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam 1959 (U.P. Act II of 1959) shall vest in any other .local au- thority (including a Gaon Sabha) established for the whole or part of the village in which the said things are situated.”

Section 117(6) injects a precarious does into the system of estates vested in Gaon Sabhas by sub-s.(1) and goes on to state:

“117(6). The State Government may, at any time, by general or special order to be published in the manner prescribed, amend or cancel any declaration or notification made in respect of any of the things aforesaid.’ whether generally or in the case of any Gaon Sabha or other local authority, and resume such thing and whenever the State Government so resumes any such thing, the Gaon Sabha or other. local authority, as the case may be, shall be enti- tled to receive and be paid compensation on account only of the development, if any, effected by it in. or over that thing: Provided that the State Government may, after such resumption, make a fresh declara- tion under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) vesting the thing resumed in the same or any other local authority (including a Gaon Sabha) and the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) as the case may be, shall mutatis mutandis, apply to such declaration.

* * * * * Before moving further, we may glance at a group of sections which have more than peripheral impact on the legal equation between Government and Sabha visa vis estates vested in the latter by the former. Section 119 carves out a power for the State Government to take away hats, bazars and melas vested in a Gaon Sabha and transfer them to a zilla parishad or other authority. Sections 122A and 122B create and regulate the Land Management Committee which is to administer the estates vested in the Sabha and s. 126, quite importantly, gives the power to the State Government to issue orders and directions to the Management Committee.

Pausing here for an instant, let us look back on the status of the State which, through its Executive branch, vests a resumed estate in a Gaon Sabha, retaining power, at any time, and without conditions or even compensation (save for actual developmental work done), to divest the land so vested and make it over to another like local authority. In such a situation where the State remains the legal master with absolute powers of disposition over the land vested pro tempore in a particular Gaon Sabha, can it be postulated that it has no legal interest in the preservation of that over which it has continuous power of operation, creation and deprivation? Government, despite vesting estates in Gaon Sabhas on the wholesome political princi- ple of decentralisation and local self-government, has and continues to have a constant hold on these estates, may be like a brooding omnipotence descending, when it chooses, to take away what it had given possession of to a Sabha. This is plainly present legal interest in Government and a sort of precarium tenans in the Sabha, notwithstanding the illu- sory expression ‘vesting’ which may mislead one into the impression that an absolute and permanent ownership has been created.

An overview of these legal prescriptions, makes one sceptical about the statutory ideology of autonomous village self-government since, so far as estates are concerned, these Sabhas have been handcuffed and thrown at the mercy or mood of the State Government. The pragmatics of the Act has reduced Gaon Sabhas to obedient holders, for the nonce, of the limited bounty of estates vested in them –a formal, fickle, homage to Art. 40 of the Constitution! Shri Shanti Bhushan did draw our attention to certain cousin statutes and other ‘remotely related provisions but the soul of his submission does not suffer by their omission in the discussion. We pass on to the spinal issues agitat- ed before us.

Locus standi The estates first vest in the State. The fulfilment of the purpose of the Act, the setting in which the corner- stone for the statutory edifice is laid and the categorical language used, especially ‘free from all encumbrances’, leave no doubt in our minds, nor was it disputed before us, that this initial vesting is absolute and inaugurates the scheme of abolition. The consequence of vesting articulated bys. 6 only underscore this conclusion. What next ensues. when the State Government, acting under s.117(1), notifies a further vesting in a Gaon Sabha is the cardinal question. Does the State retain a residu- ary legal interest, sufficient to make it a ‘person ag- grieved’, competent to challenge in appeal an adverse de- cree? And can the State canvas for the position that a proprietary right persists in it albeit its act of vesting the same estate earlier in a local authority? Does the key word ‘vest’ connote and denote divergent things in the same section and Act visa vis Government and the Gaon Sabha? Had drafting skills been better, this unlovely ambiguity could have been avoided. But courts have no choice but to take the text as it is. Zeroing in on the relevant provisions, we are inclined to concur with the High Court. With certi- tude one may assert that the State has that minimal interest to follow the proprietary fortunes of the estate so as to. entitle it to. take legal action to interdict its getting into alien hands.

The legislative project and the legal engineering visua- lised by the Act are clear and the semantics of the words used in the provisions must bend, if they can, to subserve them. To be literal or be blinkered by some rigid canon of construction may be to miss the life of the law itself. Strength may be derived for this interpretative stand from the observation in a recent judgment of this Court(1) “A word can have many meanings. To find out the exact connotation of a word in a statute, we must look to the context in which it is used. The context would quite often provide the key to meaning of the word and the sense it’ should carry. Its setting would give colour to it and provide a cue to the inten- tion of the legislature in using it. A word, as said by Holmes, is not a crystal, trans- parent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”

(1) Thiru Manickaru & Co. v. The State of Tamil Nadu. [1977] 1 S.C.R. 950.

In the instant case the Act contemplates taking over of all zamindari rights as part of land reform. However, instead of centralising management of all estates at State level, to stimulate local self-government, the Act gives an ena- bling power–not obligatory duty–to make over these estates to Gaon Sabhas which, so long as they are in their hands, will look after them through management committees which will be under the statutory control of Government under s.126. Apart from management, no. power is expressly vested in the Sabhas to dispose of the estates absolutely. The fact that as a body corporate it can own and sell property does not mean that the estates vested in a Sabha can be finally sold away, in the teeth of the provisions striking a contrary note. For, under s.117(6), if, for any reasons of better management or other, the State (Government is but the operational arm of the State and cannot, as contended, be delinked as a separate entity, in this context) the. State thinks fit to amend or cancel the earlier vesting declara- tion or notification, it can totally deprive the Sabha of, and resume from it, any estate. This plenary power to emasculate or extinguish the Sabha’s right to the estate is tell-tale. True, this cut-back on the amplitude of the vesting is not an incident of the estate created but is provided for by the Act itself. Even so, we have to envi- sion, in terms of realty law, what are the nature and inci- dents of the interest vested in the Sabha–full ownership divestible under no circumstances or partial estate with the paramount interest still surviving in praesenti in the State ?

It is reasonable to harmonize the statutory provisions to reach a solution which will be least incongruous with legal rights we are cognisant of in current jurisprudence. Novelty is not a favoured child of the law. So it is right to fix the estate created by s.117 into familiar moulds if any. Such an approach lends to the position that the vesting in the State was absolute but the vesting in the Sabha was limited to possession and management subject to divestiture by Government. Is such a construction of ‘vesting’ in two different senses in the same section, sound ? Yes. It is, because ‘vesting’ is a word of slippery import and has many meanings. The context controls the text and the purpose and scheme Project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. That is why even definition clauses allow themselves to be modified by con- textual compulsions. So the sense of the situation suggests that in s.117(1) of the Act “vested in the State’ carries a plenary connotation, while ‘shall vest in the Gaon Sabha’ imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. Lexico- graphic support is forthcoming, for this meaning. Black’s Law Die-

tionary gives as the sense of ‘to vest as ‘to give an imme- diate fixed right of present or future enjoyment, to clothe with possession, to deliver full possession of land or of an estate, to give seisin’. Webster’s III International Dic- tionary gives the meaning as ‘to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or furture enjoyment’. The High Court has sought some Engilsh judicial backing(1) for taking liberties with strict and pedantic construction. A ruling of this Court(2) has been aptly pressed into service.

There is thus authority for the position that the ex- pression ‘vest’ is of fluid or flexible content and can if the context so dictates, bear the limited sense of being in possession and enjoyment. Indeed, to postulate vesting of absolute title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the declara- tion under s.117(1) of the Act is to stultify s.117(6). Not that the legislature cannot create a right to divest what has been completely vested but that an explanation of the term ‘vesting’ which will rationalise and integrate the initial vesting and the subsequent resumption is prefera- ble, more plausible and better fulfils the purpose of the Act. We hold that the State has title to sustain he action in ejectment.

Aside from this stand, it is easy to take the view that the 1st plaintiff is a person I aggrieved and has the competence to carry an appeal against the dismissal of the suit. Of course, he who has a proprietary right, which has been or is threatened to be violated, is surely an ‘ag- grieved person’. A legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. But the right to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move the court for the protec- tion of defence or enforcement of a civil right or to ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they are not proprietarily or personally linked with the cause of action. The nexus between the lis and the plaintiff need not necessarily be personal although it has to be more than a wayfarer’s allergy to an unpalatable episode. ‘A person aggrieved’ is an expression which has expanded with the larger urgencies and felt necessities of our times. Processual jurisprudence is not too jejune to respond to societal changes and challenges:

“Law necessarily has to carry within it the impress of the past traditions, the capacity to respond to the needs of the present and enough resilience to cope with the demands of the future. A code of law, especially in the social fields, is not a document for fastid- ious dialectics; properly drafted and rightly implemented it can be the means of the order-

ing of the life of a people.”(3) (1) Richardson v. Robertson (1862) 6 L-R 75; & .Hiride v. Chorlton (1866) 2 CP 104, 116.

(2) Fruit & Vegetable Merchant’s Union v. The Delhi Improvement Dust, AIR 1957 SC 344.

(3) Address by–Khanna 1. at the Birth Centenary of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru d/16-10-76 at Allahabad.

The classical concept of a ‘person aggrieved’ is delin- eated in Re : Sidebotham ex p. Sidebotham (1880 14 Ch.D.

258). But the amplitude of ‘legal grievance’ has broadened with social compulsions. The State undertakes today activ- ities whose beneficiaries may be the general community even though the legal right to the undertaking may not vest in the community. The State starts welfare projects whose effective implementation may call for collective action from the protected group. or any member of them. New movements like consumerism, new people’s organs like harijan or mahila samajams or labour unions, new protective institutions like legal aid societies operate on the socio-legal plane, not to beat ‘their golden wings in the void’ but to intervene on behalf of the weaker classes. Such burgeoning of collec- tive social action has, in turn, generated gradual processu- al adaptations. Test suits, class actions and representa- tive litigation are the beginning and the horizon is ex- pending, with persons and organisations not personally injured but vicariously concerned being entitled to. invoke the jurisdiction of the court for redressal of actual or imminent wrongs.

In this wider perspective, who is a ‘person aggrieved ‘? Dhabolkar (1974 1 SCR 306) gives the updated answer:

“The test is whether the words ‘person ag-

grieved’ include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his inter- ests’.”

(p. 315) “American jurisprudence has recognised, far instance, the expanding importance of consumer protection in the economic system and permit- ted consumer organisations to. initiate or intervene in actions, although by the narrow rule of ‘locus standi’, such a course could not have been justified (see p. 807–New York University Law Review, Vol. 46, 1971). In fact, citizen organisations have recently been compaigning for using legal actions for pro- tection of community interest, broadening the scope of ‘standing’ in legal proceedings (see p. 403–Boston University Law Review, Vol.51. 1971).

In the well-known case of Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Peirra Sarr N. ‘Jie 1961 A.C.

617), Lord Denning observed about the Attor- ney-General’s standing thus:

” …. The words ‘person aggrieved’ are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not in-

clude, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.” (p. 324-325) Where a wrong against community interest is done, ‘no locus standi’ will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested-public body chasing the wrong-doff in court. In the case before us, Govern-

ment, in the spacious sense of ‘person aggrieved’ is comfortably placed. Its, right of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, meant to be exercised in public interest, will be seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. The estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by the State through directions to the Land Management Commit- tee and is liable to be divested without ado any time. The wholesome object of the legislature of cautiously decen- tralised vesting of estates in local self-governing units will be frustrated, if the State, the watchdog of the whole project, is to be a helpless. spectator of its purposeful bounty being wasted or lost. It must act, out of fidelity to the goal of the statute and the continuing duty to sal- vage public property for public use. Long argument is otiose to make out a legal grievance in such a situation of peril and, after all, the star of processual actions pro bono publico has to be on the. ascendant in a society where supineness must be substituted by activism if the dynamic rule of law is to fulfil itself. ‘Locus standi’ has a larger ambit in current legal semantics than the accepted, individualistic jurisprudence of old. The legal dogmas of the quiet past are no longer adequate to. assail the social injustices of the stormy present. Therefore, the State, in the present case, is entitled to appeal under s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The second, and from a practical point of view equally potent ground of defence, is that ‘appurtenant’ space envelops the whole area around the buildings and the suit for recovery of possession deserves to be dismised in toto. Let us examine this submission.

Section 9 of the Act obligates the State to settle (indeed, it is deemed to be settled) with the intermediary certain items in the estate. That provision has been set out earlier. The short enquiry is whether the entire land is ‘appurtenant’ to the buildings. The contention of the defendant flows along these lines. The structures accepted by the High Court as ‘buildings’ within the scope of s. 9 were part of a cattle fair complex. Even the mandir and the oushadalya fitted in to the hat total and the integrity of the whole could not be broken up without violating the long years of common enjoyment. It would also be, a double injury: (a) to the defendant; and (b) to the community. The hat or mela could not be held by the defendant if the land were snatched away and the Government could do. nothing on a land without the buildings belonging to the defendant. Maybe there is some sociological substance in the: presenta- tion but the broader purpose of the’ section cannot be sacrificed to the marginal cases .like the. present. The larger objective is to settle with the former intermediary only. such land as is strictly appurtenant to buildings, all the rest going to the State for implementation of the agrarian reform policy.

The key to the solution of the dispute lies in ascer- taining whether land on which the cattle fair was being held was appurtenant to the buildings or not on the strength of its use for the hat. The Solicitor General made a two- pronged attack on the defendant’s proposition.

Firstly, he argued that hats, bazars and melas were a dis- tinct interest in the scheme of Indian agrestic life and agrarian law. This right had been virtually nationalised by the Act and only the State or the Gaon Sabha. save where s. 18(a) to (c) otherwise provided, could hold a ‘fair. A ruling by this Court on an analogous subject lends support to this contention (See State of Bihar v. Dulhin Shanti Devi: AIR 1967 SC 427 relating to Bihar Land Reforms Act). The heated debate at the bar on this and allied aspects need not detain us further also because of our concurrence with the second contention of the Solicitor General that the large open spaces cannot be regarded as appurtenant to the terraces, stands and structures. What is integral is not necesarily appurtenant. A position of subordination, something incidental or ancillary or dependant is implied in appurtenance. Can we say that the large spaces are subsidi- ary or ancillary to or inevitably implied in the enjoyment of the buildings qua buildings? that much of space required for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by the High Court itself. Beyond that may or may not be necessary for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment of the chabutras as such. A hundred acres may spread out in front of a club house for various games like golf. But all these abundant acres are unnecessary for nor incidental to the enjoyment of the house in any reasonable manner. It is confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real. “Appurtenance’, in relation to a dwelling, or to a school, college …. includes all land occupied therewith and used for the purpose thereof (Words and Phrases Legally Defined—Butterworths, 2nd edn). “The word ‘appurtenances’ has a distinct and definite meaning ….Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass without being specially mentioned:Ordinarily, what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easements, alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoy- ment of the building is alone covered by the expression ‘appurtenance’. If some other purpose was being fulfilled by the building and the lands, it is not possible to contend that those lands are covered by the expression ‘appurte- nances’. Indeed ‘it is settled by the earliest authority, repeated without contradiction to the latest, that land cannot be appurtenant to land. The word ‘appurtenances’ includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way, of common …but it does not include lands in addition to that granted’. (Words and Phrase, supra). In short, the touchstone of ‘appurtenance’ is dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. Obviously, the hat, bazar or mela is not an appurtenance to the building. The law thus leads to the clear conclusion that even if the buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a hat or mela, the land is not appurtenant to the prin- cipal subject granted by s. 9, viz., buildings. This conclustion is inevitable, although the contrary argument may be ingenious. What the High Court has grant- ed, viz., 5 yards of surrounding space, is sound in law although based on guess-work in fact. The appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.

	P.B.R.					 Appeal dismissed.
	13.385CI/76---GIPF.
					   INDEX
	ACCOMPLICE:
	Whether a pointer an accomplice

[See Representation of the People Act.] …… 525 ACCUSED PLEADED GUILTY If lesser sentence could be awarded.

Murlidhar Meghraj Loya etc. v.

	State of Maharashtra etc.    .. 1
	ADMISSIONS:
	admissibility in evidence
	[See Evidence Act]	     .. 967

ADMINISTRATION OF EVACUEE PROPERTY ACT, 1950–S.40(4) (a) and rule 22–Scope of, S. 10(2) (n) out of the funds in his possession meaning of.

Custodian of Evacuee Property v.

	      Smt. Rabia Bai	       .. 255
	ALTERNATE REMEDY

–Whether a bar to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution under Art 226 of the constitution. .. 64 [See Constitution of India, 1950] … 64 ANDHRA PRADESH (ANDHRA AREA) Electricity Supply Undertaking(Acquisition) Act (Andhra 15of 1954), Ss. 5(3)(vi), 6(2)(a) (iii) and 10(2)(b)(iii)–Amounts due to undertaking from consumers prior to vesting in State-If can be recovered by State from the licence. Vijayawada Municipal Council v. Andhra Pradesh State Elec

tricity Board and Anr. .. 846 ANDHRA PRADESH GENERAL SALES TAX ACT, 1957–Excise and countervailing duty paid by the buyers directly into the Treasury –Neither the invoice nor books of the assessee (manufacturer) show the excise duty–Excise duty. If fails under “any sums charge by the dealer” occurring in the definition of “turnover”.

M/s Mc Dowell & Company Ltd. etc. v. Commercial Tax Office VII Circle Hyderabad etc. APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITT OF AN OFFENCE OF CONSUMING LIQUOR–Mem because the High Court took view that a fur- ther charge “possession of liquor” she have been framed setting aside the acquittal without find whether the order of acquittal erroneous and ordering re-t is bad–Bombay Prohibition A 1949 (Bern. XXV Sec. 66(1) r/w Sec. 378 Criminal Procedure Code (Act 11 of 1974) 1973. Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat ARBITRATION ACT, 1940, Contract between lay parties not be thwarted by narrow pedal and legalistic interpretatic Intendment of parties regarding validity of arbitraror’s appointment, whether material.

Union of India v. M/s D.M. R. &Co ….

ATTESTING WITNESS [See Succession Act] BENAMI TRAINSACTION–Pr of Benami nature. Union of India v. Moksh Buil and Financiers and Ors. .. BIHAR AND ORISSA EXC ACT, 1951 as amended Amending Acts of 1970 and 1 –Ss. 22 and 29–Power of State to auction exclusive privilege to vend liquor-Nature of payment received.

Lakhan Lal etc. v. The State of Orissa and Ors. . .811 BIHAR ELECTRICITY DUTY ACT, 1948 (As amended) S.3(2)

(e)–Scope of.

Damodar Valley Corporation v. State of Bihar and Ors. ..

HAR LAND REFORMS ACT, 1950–Ss. 4(a) and 10–Lessee of nines–If a tenure-holder or intermediary under the Act. Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd. v. The General Mining Synidicate (P) Ltd. .. 359 BOMBAY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT, 1946–S. 98(1)(a)–schedule III item 6(ii)–Scope of -Workmen laid off–Lock out de- clared later alleging unruly behaviour–Lockout if illegal. priya Laxmi Mills Ltd. v. Mazdoor Maharan Mandal, Baroda .. 709 BOMBAY PROHIBITION ACT, 949 (Bom. XXV) Sec. 66(1)(b). [See Appeal against acquittal] .. 872 BOMBAY PROVINCIAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT, As applied in Gujarat (Bom. 59 of 1949), S.284N–Applicability of .5A, Land Acquirition Act.

Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Anr. v. The Municipal Corpora-

tion of the City of Ahmedabad and Anr. .. 71 BOMBAY RENT, HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES ACT, 1947 Sub. Section 13(1)(B)–Suit for eviction on the grond of bonafide and personal need of a landlord –Whether right to sue survives to his heirs–Requirement of firm in which landlord is a partner whether his requirement–Whether decree passed in favour of landlord can be disturbed on his death.

Shantilal Thakordas and Ors. v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala .. 341

2. Sec. 15A–Sec. 5(4A)–Indian Easements Act 1882–Sec. 52-62(c)–Revocation of licence by efflux of time–Presiden- cy Small Causes Courts Act 1882–Sec.’ 47–Effect of filing of application for eviction Meaning of licence under a Subsisting agreement–Interpretation of statutes–Practice.

D.H. Manjar & Ors. v. Waman Laxman Kudav . .403 BOMBAY VILLAGE PANCHAYAT ACT (BOM. 6 OF 1933) S.89–‘House’ if includes ‘building’. Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram Panchay

	at pimpri  Waghere.	      .. 306
	BURDEN OF

–establishing urgency under the . Land Acquisition Act [See Land Acquisition Act] .. 763 CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICE (CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL AND APPEAL) Rules, 1965-Scope of–Rules applicable only when disciplinary proceedings are taken. Union of India and Anr. v.K.S. Subramanian.. 87 CENTRAL SALES TAX ACT 1956

1. Sec. 2(b) 9–Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act 1957, Central Government selling foodgrains and fertilisers, whether a dealer–Profit motive, if relevant–Whether State carried on business.

Joint Director of Food, Visakapatham v. The State of Andhra Pradesh. .. 59

2. S. 15(b)–Scope of–Assessee bought declared goods and paid States Sales Tax–Sale by way of inter-state sale-If entitled to refund of State Sales Tax. Thiru Manickam and Co. v. The State of TamilNadu . .950

3. (74 of 1956) S. 8(3)(6) and Central Sales Tax (Regulation and Turnover) Rules, 1957, r. 13Goods used in the manufac- ture or processing of goods for sale –Scope of–Fertilizers used for growing tea plants, if could be included in goods used in the manufacture of tea for sale. Travancore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Ors… 755

4. (74 of 1956) S.9(1), proviso-Scope of. M/s Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ant. .. 25 CHARGE–Fresh charge on appreciation of evidence can be ordered to be framed by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction–Criminal Procedure Code (Act. II of 1974), 1973 Secs. 386(a), 464(I) and 462(2)(a). Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat .. 872 CITY OF BANGALORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION SERVICES (GENERAL) CADRE AND RECRUITMENT REGULATIONS 1971, Reg. 3’Absorption of Senior Health Inspectors by Corporation contrary to provi- sions in Reg. 3–Effect of.

C. Muniyappa Naidu etc. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. . .791 CITY OF MYSORE IMPROVEMENT ACT, 1903, Ss. 16, 18 and 33(1)–Relevant date for determining market value for purposes of compensation, what is.

Special Land Acquisition Officer City Improvement Trust Board, Mysore v.P. Govindan. .. 549 CIVIL SERVICE

1. Powers of relaxation–Whether rules can be made retro- spectively –Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Serv- ices Rules 1962–Rule 47–Andhra Pradesh Civil’ Services (Co-operation Branch) Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Sri D. Janardhana Rao and Anr. .. 702

2. Seniority–Irregular recruitment-Regularisation- Appointments through Public Service Commission–Recruitment through centralised recruitment scheme. P.C. Patel and Ors. v. Smt. T.H. Pathak and Ors. .. 677 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

1. S.I 1 Res Judicata, whether invocable in subsequent stage of same proceedings.

Y.B. Patel and Ors. v. Y. L. patil .. 320

2. Ss. 79 and 80, suit for compensation against railway administration whether impleading Union of India as a party necessary.

State of Kerala v. The General Manager, Southern Railway Madras. .. 419

3. S.80 Whether applicable to suits filed under s.9(1) of the (M.P.) Public Trusts Act, 1951.

State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Shri Chartder Kant .. 993

4. S.115–Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere with the Trial Court’s discretionary order, when exercisable.

M/s Mechelec Engineers & Manu facturers v. M/s Basic Equipment Corporation. .. 1060

5. (Act 5 of 1908) Order VI r/w Order, XIV, rule 1(5)–Courts should not allow parties to go to trial in the absence of proper pleadings.

Union of India v. Sita Ram Jaiswal .. 979

6. (Act v of 1908) Order V], Rule 17.

[See Pleadings] .. 728

7. Act V of 1908– Section 11 Principle of res judicata–Applicability when gratuity was awarded in a previous proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act i.n the teeth of the clear provision of Rule 8.01–Scope of Rule 8.01.

Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Hyderabad v. Venkateswara Rao etc. ….. 248 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1908

1. Whether Magistrate has jurisdiction to recall dismissal order made u/s 203–Application for recalling dismissal order, whether amounts to fresh complaint. Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh .. 125

2. S.99 A–Scope of –Whether ‘Statement of grounds’ a mandatory provision.

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lalai Singh Yadav ..616

3. (Act 2 of 1974)Ss. 235 and 465 Scope of. Santa Singh v. The State of Punjab ..229

4. (Act II of 1974), 1973 S. 378. [See Appeal against ac-

quittal] .. 872

5. (Act 2 of 1974)–S.494 Prosecution applying for with- drawal of prosecution–Principles to be considered by Court in granting consent.

State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapalra & Ors. .. 335 COMPULSORY RETIREMENT–

Compulsory retirement made in public interest under the Government of lndia Decision No. 23 dated 30th November 1962 below Fundamental Rule 56 (later substituted as a new rule FR 56(i)–Mere reference to a non-subsisting rule does not invalidate the order when retirement is in public interest and bona fide.

Mayconghoan Rahamohan ,Singh v. The Chief Commissioner(Administration) Manipur and Ors. ..1022

2. [see Constitution of India] ..128 CONDONATION OF DELAY

–in applying for renewal of stage permits under the Motor Vehicles Act.

[See Motor Vehicles Act] .. 503 CONDUCT OF ELECTION RULES 1961, rr. 42 and 56(6)-. Tendered ballot paper, what is and use of. Dr. Wilfred D’Souza v. Francis Menino Jesus Ferrao .. 942 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

1. Art. 14—Combines Seniority Scheme introduced by the Reserve Bank of India to equalise opportunities of confirma- tion and pro-motion of Clerks–Some Clerks affected ad- versely by unforseen circumstances–if violative of equal opportunity clause–Right of State to integrate Cadres and lay down principles of seniority..

Reserve Bank of India & Ors. v.N. C. Paliwal & Ors. .. 377

2. Arts. 14, 16–Civil Service—Seniority–Direct Re- cruits and promotees–Quota–Whether roster implicit–Bene- fit of service-Words and Phrases “As far as practicable.”

N.K. Chauhan and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. .. 1037

3. Art. 15(4)–Reservation of seats for socially and educa- tionally backward classes in educational institutions–Annual family income test—if valid. Kumari K.S. Jayasree and Anr. v. The State of Kerala and Anr. .. 194

4. Art. 19(6)(ii) and 269(g):

[See Central Sales Tax Act] .. 59

5. Art. 3IA(1) Second Proviso-Art. 31(b)–Meaning of right conferred–9th Schedule-Whether different ceiling can be imposed for different persons-Whether second proviso to Art. 31(A)(1) imposed a feter on the legislative competence –Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act 1961 (Gujarat Act 27 of 1961)–Section 2 (21), 6. Hasmukhlal Dahayabhai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. .. 103

6. Art. 131–Disputes between State and Union –Jurisdic- tion of High Court–Charge of Excise Duty– Condition of- Whether an article manufactured or produced before the levy is imposed is excisable.

Union of India v. State of Mysore .. 842

7. Art.– 136 Practice and Procedure-Whether a Court of Criminal Appeal–Whether can interfere with concurrent findings of fact–Interference when grave and substantial injustice.

Dalbir Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab . .280

8. Art. 226–High Court–if could interefere with the Appellate orders of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Art. 226.

Income Tax Officer, Lucknow v. M/s S.B. Singbar Singh and Sons and Anr. . .214

9. Art. 226–When alternative remedies available, whether writ petition maintainable.

	G.     Sarana	  v.	University    of     Lucknow	 and
	Ors.		       .. 64

10. Art. 226, whether concurrent findings of facts by the Revenue Authorities, can be reopened in writ petition. Y.B. Patel and Ors. v. Y. L. Patil .. 32

11. Art. 235–Disciplinary action over subordinate judiciary-Governor–If bound by the recommendation of the High Court–Consultation with State Public Service Commis- sion-If warranted by Art. 235.

Baldev Raj Guliani and Ors. v. The Punjab & Haryana High Court and Ors. ..425

12. Art. 288(2)–Scope of.

Damodar Valley Corporation v. State of Bihar and Ors. ..

13. Arts. 309, 310 and 311—Scope of Art. 310 Visa Vis Arts. 309 and 311.

Union of India and Anr. v. K. S. Subramanian .. 87

14. Art. 311–Termination of services of temporary servant-Protection of Article when applicable. State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi .. 462

15. Art. 311(2), violation of –Penalty of compulsory retirement-Hyderabad Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules,) reasonable opportunity of defence at the stages of enquiry and punishment–

Consideration of extraneous matters in recommendation of penalty by High Court Chief Justice, whether valid. State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.N. Nizamuddin Ali Khan ..

CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT (ACT NO. 70 OF 1971) Ss. 2(b) 10 and 12(1) read with Article 215, Constitution of India- Remitting the punishment awarded after accepting the apolo- gy, tendered by the contemnor and ordering him to pay the cost of paper books, whether valid-Whether endorsing to the Registrar a copy of the wireless message, addressed to the State Counsel for information only amounts to contempt. Arun Kshetrapal v. Registrar, High Court, Jabalpur & Anr… 98

2. 1971, S.19(1)(b)–Finding of committal of contempt is basis of acceptance of apology–Judge exposing himself to public controversy cannot shelter behind his office. Ram Pratap Sharma and Ors. v. Daya Nand and Ors. . .242 CONTRACT OF SALE OF GOODS

–Whether interstate or intra state Sale. [See sale] .. 631 CORRUPT PRACTICE:

[See Election] . .490 COSTS:

tax matters when there is conflict among High Courts.

[See Practice] .. 9 CUSTOMS ACT, 1962, Ss. 28, 131(1)(3) and (5):

	[See Limitation]       . .983
	DEALER:

—-Whether Central Government selling foodgrains and ferti-

lizers a dealer.

[See Central Sales Tax Act, 1956] . .59 DELEGATION OF POWERS TO OFFICERS for execution of contracts under s.122(1) of Jammu & Kashmir Constitution– Contracts containing arbitration clause validity executed on behalf of the Government cannot be questioned on the plea of violation of s. 122(1.).

Timber Kashmir (P) Ltd. etc. v. Conservator of Forests, Jammu and Ors. .. 937 DEVELOPMENT REBATE

–Whether dividend when withdrawn.

[See Income Tax Act] .. 638 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT (CLASS II POSTS) RECRUITMENT (AMENDMENT) RULES, –1974, Rule 2, inter- pretation of –whether officer on special duty in the same grade as Development Officers.

S. Ramaswamy v. Union of India and Ors. .. 221 DISCIPLINARY ACTION :

—Over subordinate judiciary by High Court.

[See Constitution of India] . .425 DISMISSAL ORDER, recall of [See Code of Criminal Procedure] .. 125 DOCTRINE OF WAIVER–Bar of waiver, whether applicable to later grievance against ‘bias.’ G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow and Ors. . .64 ELECTION–Representation of the People Act, 1951–Sec. 123(2)–Sec. 100(1)(b)–Corrupt practice –Undue influ- ence–Conduct of Election Rules 1961–Rules 39(2) –Ballot paper containing mark on the reverse of the symbol–

Can be rejected as invalid-Charge of Corrupt practice–If of quasi criminal nature–Degree of proof—-Interference with appreciation of evidence by High Court –Whether elec- tion result can be lightly interfered with. M. Narayana Rao v.G. Venkata Reddy & Ors. ..490 ELECTRICITY ACT 1910 Section 22BElectricity Supply Act. 1948–Sections 1849 and 79(j) –Whether section 49 invalid for excessive delegation–Whether Electricity Board can reduce the quota of consumption if the State Government has done so–Board having determined the quota, whether can further reduce it-Whether Board can fix the quota with- out framing regulations–Practice and Procedure–Whether appellant can be allowed to raise a new question of facts for the first time.

Adoni Cotton Mills etc. etc. v. The Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and Ors. . .133 EMPLOYEES’ STATE INSURANCE ACT, 1948–Sec. 61–If debars grant of sick leave–If the Actdeals with all aspects of sickness.

The Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. Baroda and Ors. v. The Workmen and Ors. .. 80 ESCAPED ASSESSMENT [See Income Tax ] .. 207 ESTATE DUTY ACT (34 of 1953)

1. Ss. 2(15), 9 and 27–Scope of.

Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Shri Kantilal Trikam- lal . .9

2. S.5–Land covered with wild. and natural forest growths–of agricultural land.

Controller of Estate Duty, Kerala v V. Venugopala Verma Rajah .. 346

3. S.10–Gift of property the deemed to be part of the State of deceased-doner.

Controller of Estate Duty, Keral v. M/s R.V. Vishwanathan and Ors. .. 64 EVIDENCE ACT (1 of 1872)

1. Ss. 17 and 33–Evidence of admission–Admissibility. Union of India v. Moksh Builder and Financiers and Ors. .. 96

2. S.43 and Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) 0.41 r. 2 Admission of Judgments in land acquisition preceedings an additional evidence.

The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board v. H. Narayaniah etc. etc.

3. S.68–Discharge of onusproban by propounder-when execut- ic of will surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Seth Beni Chand (since dead) no by 1. rs. v. Smt. Kamla Kunwar and Ors. .. 57

4. See. 116–Whether tenant cadeny the landlord’s title. Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannat and Ors.

FINAL LIST, when may be set asid by Court. Union of India v. Dr. R.D. Nanjia and Ors. FINDINGS OF FACT [See Constitution of India] .. 32 FIRST INFORMATION REPORT–delay in lodging. [SeePenal Code] .. 280 FUNDAMENTAL RULE 56(j):

[See Compulsory retirement] .. 1025 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 189′ –Section 3(42) Meaning of per- son–Whether legislatur bound to follow definition in General Clauses ActHasmukhalal Dayabhai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. etc. .. 103 OLD CONTROL RULES, 1963, whether includes smuggled gold within their ambit. Triveni Prasad Ramkaran Verma State of Maharashtra .. 519 GRATUITY, entitlement to-whether a former employee of he Nizam’s State Railway can claim gratuity aS of right in addition to provident Fund–Government of Hyderabad Railway establishment Code, 1949, Rule . 01, 8.02, 8.05, 8.12, 8.13, .15, 8.16, 8.17 and 8.19 read with para 17 Chapter VII-interpretation of.

Andhra Pradesh State .Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad v. Venkateswara .Rao. etc. . .248 GUJARAT MUNICIPALITIES 1963, S. 38 (10)(b)(i) “act as Councillor”–ScoPe of–President of the Municipality applying or lease of land–If debarred taking land on lease–General power of supervision conferred on the President–If resident should be deemed to have acted within the meaning of 38(1)(b)(i) when lease was ranted to him by the Chief officer. Rustamji Nasorvanji Danger v. shri Joram Kunverji Ganatra and Ors. .. 884 HINDU LAW If a co-widow can relinquish ght of survivorship–Whether after relinquishment, a widow an dispose of property by will.

Rindumati Bai v. Nrarbada’ Prasad . .988 RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENT-Hindu temple forming part of a Jain Institution–When may be treated as a Hindu religious endow- ment.

Commissioner of Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Mysore v. Sri Ratnavaram Heggde (deceased) by 1.

	rs.	   . .889
	IDENTIFICATION PARADE:
	[See Penal Code]	  .. 280
	INCOME TAX ACT 1922

1. S.2.(4)–When can single and isolated sale be a busi- ness transaction within the meaning of -Onus probandi on the Taxation Department–Initial purchase with intention of advantageous sale–Earning profit on delivery of goods not necessary.

Dalmia Cement Ltd., v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi. .. 5 54

2. (11 of 1922) Ss. 2 (6A)(e)’and 10(2) (vi-b)-Development rebate treated as accumulated profits–Withdrawal of amount by shareholder from Company’s account–if withdrawal can be treated as dividend since amount withdrawn is within accumulated profits.

P.K. Badiani v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay . .638

3. S.9–Irrevocable rent–If could be deducted from income from property of only one year-Exemption–If could be given only once.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow v. Shri Madho Parsad Jatia. .. 202

4. Sec. 23A(1)–Explanation 2(1) to Sec. 23A(1)–Meaning of investment Companies, whether restricted to shares stocks and other securities or used in contradistinction with manufacturing processing and trading operations–Indian Companies Act 1913–Sec. 87(f)–Companies Act 1956–Sec. 372(11). Nawn Estates (P) Ltd. v. C.I.T., West Bengal .. 798

5. Ss. 23A and 35(1)–Whether income tax officer has power under s. 35(1) to rectify an order passed under s. 23A.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur. v. M/s. J.K. Commercial Corporation Ltd. etc. .. 512

6. Sec. 25A(3)–Claims for partition and disruption of the Hindu Undivided family disallowed by I.T.O.–Appeal under the Act filed against the orders of.I.T.O. also dis- missed–No reference under the Act challenging the Tribu- nal’s order dismissing the appeal was taken, but subse- quentiy got a preliminary decree for partition passed by the civil court during the pendency of the apPeal–Whether t he Income Tax Authorities are bound by the subsequent parti- tion decree of the civil court.

Narendra kumar J. Madi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Guja

rat 11, Ahmedabad .. 112

7. Ss. 34 and 42, Income Tax Act (43 of 1961) s. 147 and Income Tax Rules, 1922, r. 33 corresponding to r. 10 of 1962 Rules–One 0 f t he met hods mentioned in corresponding to r. 10 of 1962 Rules–One of the methods mentioned in r. 33 applied for assessment–Higher tax liability if another method in rule adopted–If a case of income escaping as- sessment.

Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal- 1, Calcutta v.

Simon Carves Ltd. .. 207

8. S. 5(2)-Non-resident company receiving income outside India-Income if accrued in India.

84SCI/77 The Performing Right Socio)Ltd. & Anr. v. The Commr.Income Tax and Ors. .. 1 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES A( 1907–Sec. 2(00)-Meaning of trenchment–Can termination service by efflux of time cover by the expression retrenchment Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The p siding Officer, Labour. Court Orissa and Ors. .. 6

2. Sec. 36–When legal practioners can appear before the Tribunal–Whether Secs. 36(1) an 36(2) is controlled by s. ’36(4) Pradip Port Trust, Pradip Their Workmen .. 5 INTER-STATE SENIORITY [See State’s Reorganisation Act] . .82 INTERPRETATION

1. Amendment of a section–could be used to interpret earlier provision in the Act.

Sone Valley Portland Cem Co. Ltd. v. The General Mini Syndicate (P) Ltd. .. 3

2. “Refund meaning of–Subsequent amendment of Section If could. be used to interpr earlier ambiguous provision. Thiru Manickam & Co. v. Sic of Tamil Nadu .. 9

3. “should” contained in a clause “should” possesses a post graduate degree and requist experience whether mandato- ry or directory–“Post-gradual Meaning of. Smt. Juthika Bhattacharya The State of Madhya prad and Ors. .. 4

4. Contract-of.

[See Arbitration Act] INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS–Principles application to interpretation of document-Notifications Nos. F. 9/5/59 R & S published in gazette dt. 17-1-60 u/s 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957) and Notifica- tion GSR 486 u/s 1(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) gazetted on 21-4-62 Whether the whole of Mauza Chowkri Mubarakbad and whole of Onkar Nagar and Lekhpura were meant to be notified.

Jangbirv. Mahavir Prasad Gupta ..670 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES [See Bombay Rents/-Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947] . .403 Estate Duty Act and other taxing statutes–Principles. Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Shri Kantilal Trikam- lal Expressions not being terms of art whether to be construed in technical sense or ordinary popular sense as used by businessmen –Legislative history as guide to construction–Genesis and development of law as key to interpretation-Whether English decisions useful guides or construction of analogous provisions, fundamental concepts and general principles.

Nawn Estates (P) Ltd. v.C.I.T., West Bengal .. 798 Provision in Act substituted by another–Amending provision avoid- -Effect.

State of Maharashtra v. The Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. .. 1002 Rules as an aid–Use of Statement of objects and reasons. Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat Pimpri Waghere. .. 306

6. Statute when retrospective.

K. Eapen Chacko v. The Provident Investment Co. P. Ltd. ..

7. When a statute could be read retrospectively. State of Kerala v. philomina etc. & Ors. ..

JAMMU & KASHMIR CONSTITUTION, S. 122 [See Delegation of Powers] .. 937 JUDGMENTS Admission of judgments in Land Acquisition proceedings.

	[See Land Acquisition]	   .. 178
	JURISDICTION

1. –of High Courts to interfere with the trial Court’s discretionary order.

[See C.P.C.] .. 1061

2. of High Court under Art. 226 to interfere with orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

[See Constitution of India ] .. 214 KARNATAKA LAND REFORMS ACT, 1961, Ss. 107 and 133’Whether applicable to land unauthorisedly held after expiry of lease.

Corporation of the City of Bangalore v.B.T.

Kampanna . .269 KARNATAKA RECRUITMENT OF GAZETTED PROBATIONERS (Class I and 11 Posts appointment by competitive examination) Rules, 1966–R. 9 read with Part IV of Schedule II–Scope of–Awarding block marks in interview–If violative of the Rule.

State of Karnataka and Anr. v. M. Farida & Ors. ..

KERALA LAND REFORMS ACT

1. 1963 S. 84 Scope of interpretation–When a statute could be read retrospectively.

State of Kerala and Ors. v. Philomina etc. and Ors. .. 273

2. 1964 Secs. 81, 83, 84, 85, 85A and 86–Voluntary trans- fers made after notified date whether valid.State of Kerala and Ors. v. K.A. Gangadharan .. 960

3. (Kerala 1 of 1964) as amended in 1969 and 1971, Secs. 3(1), 50A, 52, 73, 108, 125 and 132(3) Scope of. K. Eapen Chacko v. The Provident Investment Co. P. Ltd. .. 1026 LAND ACQUISITION ACT

1. City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945, Ss. 16, 18 and 27–Notification under Ss. 16 and 18 on different dates–Date for determining market .value for awarding compensation for acquisition of land. The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust, Board v. 11. Narayaniah etc. .. 178

2. Act 1894 Ss. 5A, 6 and 17(4)-Burden of establishing urgency On whom lies.

Narayan Govind Gayate etc. v. State of Maharashtra ..

3. (1 of 1894) s.6A–If mandatory- Effect of non-compliance in case of beneficial schemes.

Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Anr. v. The Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad and Anr. . .71 LEGAL ENTITY [See Railways Act, 1890] . .419 LIMITATION

1. for rectification under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, S. 22.

[See U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948] . .25.

2. Period of limitation in respect of suo moto revision by Central Government to annul or modify any order of erroneous refund of duty when begins–Customs Act, 1962, Sec. 28, 131(1)(3)(5) scope of.Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. . .983 LIMITATION ACT

1. 1963 Ss. 5 and 29(23)-If applicable. Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal M.P. and Ors. .. 563

2. 1963, S.I 2(2) whether applicable to revision petitions filed under section 10, U.P. Sales Tax Act. Time spent in obtaining second–copy of. impugned order, whether to be excluded in computing limitation period for filing revi- sion petitions.

Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Madan Lal and Sons Ba– reilly. . .683 MADHYA pRADESH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT 1956Sec. 138(b)–Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act Sec. 7—Must rental value under the Municipal Act follow the standard rent under Accommodation Control Act When premises let out–When used by owner.

Municipal Corporation, Indore, and Ors. v. Smt. Ratna Prabha ana Ors. .. 1017 MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT 1951s. 9(1): [See Code of Civil Procedure] ..993 MADRAS GENERAL SALES TAX ACT 1959, Schedule 11, items 7(a and (b)–If ultra vires.

M/s. Guruviah Naidu and Sons etc v. State of T.N. and Anr. MINES AND MINERALS (REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT) ACT, 1957–

1. State Government reserved certain areas for exploitation of minerals in public sector–If had the power to do so.–State Governments–If could reject application of private persons.

Amritlal Nathubhai Shah and Ors. v. Union Government of India and Anr …. 372

2. S.30A–Scope of.

State of Bihar and Anr. etc. v. Khas Karampura Collieries Ltd. etc. .. 157 MINIMUM WAGES ACT 1948, Entry 22 Explanation Part 1 of Schedule, construction of word includes–Whether ,potteries Industry includes manufacture of Mangalore pattern roofing tiles.

The South Gujarat .Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Associations and Ant. v. The State of Gujarat and Anr .. 878 MONOPOLY OF BUS ROUTES-Whether permitting the existing private operators to operate till the date of expiry of their permits creates a monopoly.

Sarjoo Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar and Ors. .. 661 MOTOR VEHICLES ACTS 1939

1. S. 43(1)–State Government can direct imposition of fiscal rates on stage-carriage operators for carrying mails as condition of permit–Ss. 48(3) and 59(3)(c) such direc- tions do not interfere with quasi judicial functions of Regional Transport Authority. Special provisions of s. 48(3) (XV) do not override general provisions of s. 43(1)(d)(1). Sree Gajana Motor Transport Co. Ltd. v. The State of Karna-

taka and Ors. .. 665

2. Sec. 47–Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1951–Rule 108(c)-Whether considerations in Sec.47 for grant of stage permits to be mentioned in the order.

Ikram Khan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Ors.

.. 459

3. S.58(2) proviso–Delay in.applying for renewal of exist- ing permit –If could be condoned–Chapter IVA–If a self contained code –Renewal application under s. 68F(ID)–Whether s. 57 applicable.

Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.S. and Ors. .. 563

4. Sec. 68D–Scope of ‘Whether there should be a finding on each and every separate objection raised. Sarjoo prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar and Ors. ..

MURDER:

–Distinction between S.299 and 300 I.P.C. [See Penal Code] .. 601 NECESSARY PARTY:

[See Civil Procedure Code] .. 419 NEW CASE

—Courts’ Whether can make a [See Partnership Act] .. 583 NEW DELHI HOUSE RENT CONTROL ORDER 1939—C1. Standard rent of house fixed in 1944–Rateable value enhanced on the basis of rent received in 1966-Whether rating should be correlated to actual income.

New Delhi Municipal Committee v.M.N. Soi and Anr. . .731 NEW PLEA [See Adoni Cotton Mills v. Andhra Pradesh State Elec

	tricity Board]		    .. 133
	NOLLES PROSEQUE:

–Principle to be followed by court (See Criminal Procedure Code Act 2 of 1974) . .335 OTHER RIGHTS in Explanation 2 to s. 2(15) meaning of. Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Shri Kantilal Trikam- lal .. 9 PARTNERSHIP ACT 1932 Sec. 69 –Whether mandatory–Whether suit can be filed by unregistered firm–Dissolution of firm–Suit by a ‘partner of erstwhile unregistered firm, If other partners of erstwhile firm necessary parties –Materi- al alterations in a document-Effect of–Suit for Specific and ascertained amount-Whether court can make out new case and grant partial relief on another basis. Loonkaran Setia etc. v. Ivan E. Johan and Ors.

etc. .. 853 PENAL CODE–S.34–Specific evidence for infliction of fatal wound not required–Community of intent with participatory presence fixes constructive liability. Harshadsingh @ Baba Pahalvansingh Thakura v. The State of Gujarat .. 626

2. Ss. 299 and 300–Culpable homicide not amounting to murder and murder–Distinction–Tests to be applied in each case–S.300 Thirdly I.P.C.–Scope of. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. . .601

3. Section 302--Non-examination of eye witnesses–Interest- ed witnesses–Meaning of–Necessity of examining independent witnesses –Motive–Delay in lodging F/R and despatch to Magistrate-Identification parade, necessity of. Dalbir Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab .. 280 PLEADINGS

1. Amendments to–Amendment to the pleadings to introduce an entirely different case, under the guise of permisible inconsistent pleas which is likely to cause prejudice to the other side cannot be allowed–Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908)–Order VI Rule 17.

M/s Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. M/s Ladha Ram and Col . .728

2. Under section 70 of the Contract (Act 9) of 1872–Ingre- dients necessary to be pleaded.

Union of India v. Sita Ram Jaiswal. .. 979 POSSESSION “Possession” to attract criminal liability must be “conscious possession”.

Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat .. 872 POWERS OF OFFICER to rectify an order passed u/s 23A [See Income Tax Act] .. 512 POWER TO AUCTION

–exclusive privilege to vend liquor [See Bihar and Orissa Excise Act. . .811 PRACTICE

1. Costs in tax matters when there is conflict among High Courts Controller of Estate Duty, Gujrart v. Shri Kantilal Trikamalal …

2. Duty of High Court when there is conflict between deci- sions the Supreme Court–Upsetting concurrent findings of fact second appeal-Propriety.

State of U.P . v. Ram Chandrs Trivedi .. 46:

3. Duty of High Court where there, is conflict between the view expressed by Divisional bench and larger benches of the Supreme Court.

Union of India and Anr. K.S. Subramanian.

4. Non-suiting for want of proper pleadings at the appellate stage by the Supreme Court when parties went to trial and issues were raised and the litigation went through the course of trial and appeal is not desirable. Union of India v. Sita .Ram Jaiswal .. 979

5. Supreme Court will not entertain a complaint on facts and interfere with a finding of facts by the appellate Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Patel Jethabhai Chatur v. State of Gujarat .. 872 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

1. Further plea taken in the affidavit rejoinder to the writ petition shall not be allowed to be agitateSarjoo Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar and Ors. .. 861

2. High Court’s duty to give reasons even in cases of sum- mary dismissal.

Shankar Gopinath Apte v. Gangabai Hariharrao Patwardhan ..

3. Interference with findings on reliability of evidence only in exceptional circumstances.

4. Harshadsingh@ Baba pahalvansingh Thakur v. The State ..

5. Re-appraisal of evidence by Supreme Court in spite of concurrent findings of fact, proper when miscarriage of justice has occurred.

Mohammad Aslam v. State of Uttar Pradesh .. 689 Whether High Court can direct a Minister to be impleaded as a party and file his personal affidavit. State of Punjab ana Anr. v. Y.P. Duggal and Ors. .. 96 PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1947 Sec. 5(1)(e) and 5(1)(d) Sec. 5(2) Misappropriating Govt. funds.–Retaining Govt. Funds by a Govt. Servant–Evidence Act, Sec. 154–When can witness be declared hostile–Can evidence of a hostile witness be accepted–Evidence Act Sec.– 105–Onus of proving exceptions in IPC on accused–Degree of proof–Criminal Trial–Effect of non–examination of materi- al witness-Conviction on evidence of a solitary witness–Whether adverse inference can be drawn against accused for not leading evidence–Onus of prosecution-Pre- sumption of innocence.

	Rabindra       Kumar	   Dey	     v.	      State	  of
	Orissa			 . .439

PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT 1910.

1. S. 16-Proviso–Scope of.

	Murlidhar    Meghraj   etc.   v.   State   of	 Maharashtra
	etc.	       .. 1

2. sec. 16(1) (a) (2) (1)–2(1) (c) 2(1) (j)–2(1) Preven- tion of Food Adulteration of Rules.Rules 23, 28 and 29 Can conviction be based on sole testimony of Food Inspector–Can an article fail under clause (j) and (i) of Sec. 2(i)–Are they mutually exclusive or overlapping-When rules are silent about colouring material can use of dye be punished–Do provisions of Probation of Offenders Act apply to offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration ActPrem Ballab and Anr v. The State (Delhi Admn.) .. 592 PRIVITY OF CONTRACT When a company has severa branches and there is a contract between the buyer and one of the branches, the contract of sale is between the company and the buyer. English Electric Company of India 1Ltd. v. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. .. 631PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT, 1958–Applicability to cases under POFA [See Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1950] .. 59 PROCEDURE–When a court of appeal can interfere in the lower court’s Judgment.

Smt. Padma Uppal etc. v. State of Punjab and Ors. .. 329 PROMOTIONS–Right to promotion-Whether promotion of class III employees to Class is governed by “Advance Correction Slip No. 7)” introducing w.e. f. March, 11, 1973, new rules 324 to 328 and substituting a new rule 301 in Chapter III of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual Scope and applica- bility of Rules 301 and 328 (2) (4) and (5) S.K. Chandan v. Union of India and Ors. .. 785 PROPERTY right to dispose of by will by a widow [See Hindu Law] . .988 PROVIDENT FUND–Illegal payment of gratuity in the past will not affect legal claims to Provident Fund. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Hyd. v.P.

Venkateswara Rao etc. ..248 PUNJAB GENERAL SALES TAX ACT (Punjab Act 46 of 1948), S. 11(2) Notice under–Whether should be issued within a par- ticular period.

The Indian Aluminium Ltd. & Anr. v. The Excise and Taxa– tion Officer and Anr. . .716 PUNJAB CIVIL SERVICE RULES, Vol. 1 Rules 2.49 and 3.10 to 3.16–Junior Vernacular Cadre teachers officiating in senior vernacular cadre enti- tled to benefit of their substantive post . State of Punjab and Ors. v, Labh Ram and Ors. .. 832 RAILWAYS ACT, 1890 S. 3(6), Railway Administration, whether a separate legal entity.

State of Kerala v. The General Manager. S.R. Madras . .419 RAILWAYS ESTABLISHMENT CODE–Para–157–Whether the para- graph empowers the Railway Board to make rules for the gazetted Railway servants–Construction of para 157. S.K. Chandan v. Union of India and Ors.

RAILWAY ESTABLISHMENT MANUAL–Whether Rule 328 (2) providing for the invalidity of promotions made in the Diesel Locomotive Works from August 1, 1961 to March 11, 1973 casts an obligation on the Railway Board to recall all promotions and to form a fresh panel–Meaning of “Promotion made in the Diesel Locomotive Works in Rule 328 (2) and promotion to the higher grades in Rules 328(4)”.

	S.K.	 Chartdan     v.      Union	of     India	 and
	Ors.		     . .785
	RATEABLE VALUE
	(See New Delhi House Rent Control Order)       .. 731
	REAPPRAISAL
	of Evidence by Supreme Court.
	(See Practice and Procedure)	   ..689
	REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY
	See Constitution of India  .. 128
	2.  to be heard.
	(See State's Reorganisation Act)
					 . .827

REHABILITATION ACT, 1954 S. 14(1) (b) “Such cash balances

–Meaning of.

	Custodian    of	   Evacuee   Property,	 v.    Smt.    Rabia
	Bai	       . .255

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1950. Election petition–Not accompanied by impugned pamphlet-If liable to be rejected–Printer-If could be called an accom- plice –Failure to send pamphlet to District Magistrate as required by s. 127 A(2) – If makes the printer an accom- plice.

Thakur Virendra Singh v . Vimal Kumar .. 525 See. 15, 21, 22, 23″Preparation and revision of electoral roll–Amendment, transposition or deletion of entries in electoral roll–Provision of Sec. 23, if mandatory–Repre- sentation of the People Act, 1951–Every person on elec- toral roll whether entitled to vote even if name not brought in accordance with law–Sec. 100(1) See. 123(1) (A)–Bribery –Proof of–Quasi-criminal in nature–inter- ference with appreciation of evidence by High Court, Bihar and Orissa Act, 1922 Sec. 389.

Ramji Prasad Singh v. Ram Bilas Jha and four Ors. . .741 REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951. S. 9A–Contract signed as President, Gram Panchayat Rejection of nomination paper-If valid– Improper rejection-If courts could give relief under s. 100(1) (c). Jugal Kishore Patnaik v. Ratnakar Mohanty .. 49 Sec. 77 Incurring expenses in excess of what is per- missible–Interference by this Court with appreciation of evidence by High Court.

Nangthomban Ibomeha Singh v. Leisanghem Chandramoni Singh and Ors, .. 573 RES JUDICATA.

(See Civil Procedure Code)..320 RETRENCHMENT

–Meaning of (See industrial Disputes Act) .. 586 RETROSPECTIVITY.

service rules.

(See Civil Service) . .702 REVISION

–suo moto limitation for (See Limitation) .. 983 RIGHT OF MANAGEMENT Hindu Law–Joint Hindu Undivided family–Whether a junior member of the family can act as Karta with the consent of all the other members, if the senior member gives up his right.

Narendra Kurnar J. Modi v. Commissioner of Income Tax Gujarat 11. Ahmedabad .. 112 RIGHT TO PLEAD

— by legal Practitioners before the Labour Tribunal. (See IndustriaI Disputes Act).. 537 RIGHT TO SUE by the heirs (See Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947) .. 341 RIGHT TO SUE for eviction –by a co-owner. (See West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956) . .395 SALE–Contract for sale of goods, whether inter-State sale or intraState sale–Ingredients–Central Sales Tax Act

Section 3(a).

English Electric Company of India Ltd. v. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. .. 631 SALES REORGANISATION ACT (37 of 1956) s. 115-– Oppertunity to hear after final inter-state seniority list is prepared after giving opportunity to aggrieved officers to make representation against provisional list–If should be given.

	Union	 of    India	v.    Dr.    R.D.    Nanjiah	 and
	Ors.		      .. 827

SALES TAX –Central Provinces Bear Sales Tax Act, 1947 s. 2(g) Expln. II–Goods within States at the time of contract of sale, mixed up outside state and the mixture sold ‘sale’ if taxable.

State of Maharashtra etc. v. Central Provinces Manganese Ore. Co. Ltd. .. 1002

2. Supply of crude oil by Oil and Natural Gas Commission from Assam to refinery of Indian Oil Corporation in Bihar

–Supply under directions of Government at price fixed, by Government-If inter-state sale liable to Central Sales Tax. Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. State of Bihar and Ors

SECOND APPEAL 1 Disturbance of concurrent finding of fact without consid- ering the objects of the notification or discussing any principle of construction of documents which could indicate that a point of law had really arisen for a decision is patently exceeding the jurisdiction of the High Court–Civil Procedure Code (Act V) 1908, S. 100Jangbir v. Mahavir Prasad Gupta .. 670

2. — Propriety of upsetting concurrent findings in (See Practice) – .. 462 SENIORITY

1. — Direct recruits of Promotees.

(See Constitution of India) ..1037

2. When recruitment irregular. (See Civil Service) .. 677 SENIORITY SCHEME

— Right of State to lay down principles of seniority (See Constitution of India) .. 377 SENTENCE Judicial Jurisdiction to soften the sentence in economic crimes and food offences.

(See Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954) ..

	SICKNESS BENEFIT
	(See	   Employees'	    State	Insurance	Act,
	1948)		      ..80
	SOLE WITNESS
	     --conviction  based on

(See Prevention of Corruption Act) . . .439 SPECIAL RULES 1962–Rule 4.

Government of A.P. and Ors. v. Shri D. Janardhana Rao Anr. .. 702 SUCCESSION ACT, 1925–Sec. 6″ legal will –Genuineness of Suspicious circumstances–Burden of proof–Degree of proof. Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur and Ors. .. 925

2. 1975, S. 63 (c), Attesting witness defined. Seth Beni Chand (Since dead now by 1. rs. v. Smt. Kamh Kunwar and Ors. .. 578 SUMMARY DISMISSAL

–Court’s duty to give reasons.

(See Practice and Procedure) . .411 SUSPENDED OFFICER REINSTATED AND LATER COMPULSORILY RETIRED

–Effect of— If order of suspension merge with order of reinstatement.

Baldev Raj Guliani and Ors. v. The Punjab & Haryana High Court and Ors, ….42 SUSPENSION ORDERS

–Whether merges with order of Retirement (See Suspended Officer) . .425 TERMINATION

— of services of temporary servants. (See Constitution of India) .. 462 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (4 of 1882) S. 53AIndian Easements Act (5 of/882) s. 60(b) and Indian Contract Act (9 of 1872)S. 221--Scope of.

Shankar Gopinath Apte v. Gangs bai Hariharrao Patwardhan ..

U.P. INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION ACT, 1921–Whether the basic section of a college is within the scope of. Commissioner, Lucknow Division and Ors. v. Kumari Prem Lata Misra. . . 957 U.P. SALES TAX ACT, 1948 S. 3-A, Notification issued under-Rule for constructing words–Whether carbon paper is taxable as ‘Paper’ Whether ribbon is accessory or part of typewriter. State of Uttar Pradesh v. M/s Kores (India) Ltd. ..

S. 22 Order of rectification passed within 3 years of orginal order, but served beyond 3 years–/f barred by limitation.

M/s Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. (Coal Sales ) Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Anr. .. 25 U.P. ZAMINDARI ABOLITION AND LAND REFORMS ACT, 1950, — Section 117-

Scope of–State vests lands in Gaon Sabha–Suit for eject- ment–.Goan Sabha did not appeal-State–If had locus standi. Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar 5. Pradesh and Ors. .. 1072 UNION AND STATE DISPUTES (See Constitution of India) .. 842 VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS (See Kerala Land Reforms Act) . .960 WEALTH TAX ACT (27 of 1957) S.2(e)(i) –Agricultural Lands, What are–Tests for determining.

Commissioner of Wealth Tax, A.P. v. Officer in charge (Court of Wards ) Paigah. .. 146 WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT 1956– Sec. 13(1)

(f)–Whether one of the co-owners can file suit for eviction without impleading other co-owners-Whether a co-owner, an-owner for the purpose of an eviction suit–Stage for raising objection about frame of suit. Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Ors. .. 395 WILL

— genuineness of legal will degree of proof. (See Succession Act, 1925) .. 925 WORDS AND PHRASES

1. “As far as Practicable”

(See Constitution of India) ….1037

2. “House, if it concludes buildings”. (See Bombay Village Panchayat Act) .. 306

3. “Other rights” in Explanation 2 to S. 2(15) of the Estates Duty Act, meaning of.

(See “Other rights”) .. 9

4. “Out of the funds in his possession” and “such cash balances”. Meaning of Custodian of Evacuee Property v. Smt. Rabia Bai . .255

5. — See “Person” meaning of General Clauses Act) .. 103

6. “Post graduate” Meaning of (See Interpretation) . .477

7. “restoration” in Section 70 of the Contract Act, meaning of.

union of India v. Sita Barn Jaiswal .. 979

8. “Substituted” meaning of.

State of Maharashtra etc. v. The General Provinces Manganese Ore. Co. Ltd. .. 1002

9. — Vest–Persons aggrieved-Appurtenance meaning of. Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. .. 1072 WRIT JURISDICTION — High Court cannot interfere with a finding .of fact based upon relevant circumstances and when it is not shown to be perverse–The Constitution of India, Article 226.

Khazan Singh Ors. v. Hukan Singh and Ors. .. 636 WRIT JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT–Scope for interference with findings of depart. mental authorities. Mis Khushiram Behari Lal and Co. v. The Assessing Authority Sangrur Anr. .. 752 M– 184 SCI/77–2500- -9-8-77–GIPF.

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