- Sunil Kumar choudhary&Ors vs state of Jharkhand and anr
- Rudrakant Jha&Ors vs state of Jharkhand and anr
- Satyendra Kumar vs state of Jharkhand and anr
- Ranjeet Mahato vs state of Jharkhand and anr
- Onkarnath pandey vs state of Jharkhand
- Shakil Ahamed vs State of Jharkhand
- Debabrata saha vs State of Jharkhand
- Amit Kumar Gupta &anr vs State of Jharkahand
- Nagar chandra mahato vs state of Jharkhand
- Devendra kumar @pawan kumar vs state of jharkhand
- Sabita Devi vs state of Jharkhand
- Arun sharma vs State of Jharkhand
- Radhe Raman Naik vs State of Jharkhand
- Sraban kumar agarwala vs State of Jharkhand
- Prashanth Kumar Tripathi vs State of Jharkand
- Rajkishori Devi vs State of Jharkhand
- Sarda Devi vs State of Jharkhand
- Nayeem Hasan Vs State of Jharkhand
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.813 of 2008
1. Sunil Kumar Choudhary
2. Suman Prakash Choudhary @ Anil Kumar
3. Sudhir Kumar Choudhary @ Sudhir Kumar
4. Kaushal Kumar Choudhary @ Kaushal Kumar @ Kaushal Kishore Choudhary
5. Sunita Kumari
6. Sujanti Kumari
7. Madan Mohan Choudhary @ Bishu Choudhary
8. Shakuntala Devi
9. Sudha Devi @ Sudha Kumari
10. Kanhaiya @ Kanhaiya Choudhary- -- -- -- -- ---Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Pushplata Choudhary-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --Opposite Parties
CORAM : THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE D.K. SINHA
For the Petitioners : Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Sr. Advocate
M/s. Rishav Dev & Rajesh Kumar, Advocates
For the State : Mr. D.K. Prasad, A.P.P.
For the Opp. Party No.2 : M/s. Manoj Kr. Sah &
Md. Imteyaz Ashrad, Advocates
-----
Reserved on: 6-1-2011 Pronounced on: 04 - 02-2011
D.K. Sinha, J. The petitioners have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this
Court under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure for quashment
of the entire criminal prosecution arising out of Complaint Case
No.664 /07 pending before the S.D.J.M., Ranchi including the order
impugned dated 19.5.2008 by which cognizance of the offence was
taken under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Prosecution story in short was that the opposite party No.2 was
married to the accused-petitioner No.1 on 21.6.1999 according to
Hindu rites and customs prevalent at Dumka where her father was
posted there during service. After her marriage, she went to her
matrimonial home at Maksudpur in the district of Patna. It was
alleged in the complaint that within a month of her marriage, the
accused persons started extending torture and subjecting her to
inhumane behaviour and cruelty and they started demanding
Rs.5,00,000/- to be brought from her parental home in spite of the
fact that valuable gifts were presented to her on the eve of her
marriage. As the parents of the complainant had financial
2
constraints to meet out such unreasonable demand, they tried their
sincere efforts to persuade the accused persons to keep the
complainant properly and humanely but of no avail. It was alleged
that the complainant at times was kept confined in the room without
food and water and used to be assaulted at their hands. Yet, the
father of the complainant used to make over certain amounts to the
husband-petitioner No.1 from time to time but it did not satisfy the
greed of the accused persons. When the complainant became
pregnant, she was sent back to Ranchi where her father was posted
on transfer from Dumka. She delivered a male child at Ranchi but
none of them including her husband-petitioner No.1 ever cared to
see or to take care of either the complainant or newly born child.
After some time, she returned back to her matrimonial home where
she was again subjected to cruelty and mental harassment.
Although she tried to cope with the situation but all the accused
humiliated by putting remarks that she had illicit relation with one
Sudhir Kumar Choudhary, who was the accused No.3 in the
complaint case and ultimately, she was driven out from her
matrimonial home in the month of January, 2004 and that finding no
way out, she took shelter at her parental home. But prior to that, her
almirah was broken open by the accused persons and all her
valuable belongings and jewelleries were removed by them. On
15.5.2004
, she returned back to her matrimonial home with one Shyam Babu Choudhary but she was asked to bring Rs.5,00,000/- for her entry in the matrimonial home. They further refused to return back her pieces of jewellery and other valuables. Finding no way out, she lodged a Complaint Case No.691/04 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi for the alleged offence under Sections 498A/406 Indian Penal Code against the accused. Simultaneously, she initiated a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against her husband petitioner No.1 in the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi being Maintenance Case No.64/2004. During the pendency of both the cases, husband-petitioner No.1 came to Ranchi and offered to resolve the dispute with the complainant on his assurance and undertaking that he would properly behave with her and would not demand anything from her parents. Husband-petitioner further undertook that none of his relatives would extend cruelty to her in any manner. Upon such assurance given by her husband-petitioner No.1 Sunil Kumar Choudhary in presence of the accused No.10 Kanhaiya, she expressed her willingness to accompany her husband to Patna and in that process, compromise petition was filed before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi which was accepted and thereafter, Complain Case No.691/04, which she had filed for the alleged offence under Sections 498A/406 of the Indian Penal Code was withdrawn. She was then taken to her matrimonial home at Maksudpur but the accused persons with the little pause again started similar behaviour to her by extending mental and physical torture. She was then taken to Anisabad and from there to Patliputra Colony, Patna, but her miseries did not end here and she had been pressurized to bring money from her parental home, lest her father would be responsible for the consequences which would may happen in future with her. It was further alleged that petitioner No. 2 and petitioner No.5 forcibly tried to send her to Ranchi but she refused. However, on 2.2.2007 she was informed that her husband was at Ranchi, who wanted her to be there to finalize certain issues with her father at Ranchi and on such pretext, she was taken to Ranchi by the accused persons, who left her at the bus stand, asking that she would not be accepted by her husband and in-laws until she would carry Rs.5,00,000/-. Her minor son was forcibly retained by the accused persons. That apart, it was seriously alleged that her husband insisted her to live with accused No.3 Sudhir Kumar Choudhary and thereby extreme form of cruelty was demonstrated.
3. Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, at the outset submitted that the entire criminal proceedings against the petitioners as well as the order by which cognizance of the offence was taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate was bad in law as the same was lacking territorial jurisdiction in view of the fact that no part of the cause of action took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the C.J.M./ S.D.J.M., Ranchi. Learned Sr. Counsel further submitted that the offence under which the cognizance was taken by the court was not a continuing offence, as such, the same could not be tried at Ranchi. Cognizance of the offence under Sections 498A/406/120-B of the Indian Penal Code was taken mechanically as the territorial jurisdiction of the court was not examined since the contents of the complaint reflected that no part of occurrence took place within the territorial jurisdiction of C.J.M., Ranchi and therefore, the entire criminal prosecution of the petitioners was liable to be quashed.
4. In Bhura Ram and others versus State of Rajasthan and another, reported in (2008)11 Supreme Court Cases 103, the Apex Court of India held, “The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the complainant left the place where she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab. The court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As a consequence thereof, the proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be returned to the complainant and if she so wishes she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.”
5. Learned counsel, Mr. Manoj Kr. Sah, appearing on behalf of the opposite party No.2, did not dispute the legal position except by stating that the opposite party No.2 having been forced to leave her matrimonial home preceded by torture and demand of money would come within the purview of mental cruelty and harassment which continued even at the place where she returned back to her father at Ranchi and therefore, no error was caused by the C.J.M., Ranchi while taking cognizance of the offence and the learned S.D.J.M., Ranchi found prima facie case against the accused petitioners for the alleged offence under Sections 498A/406/120-B of the Indian Penal Code.
6. Supreme Court of India in Manish Ratan and others versus State of M.P. and another, reported in (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 262 held, “7. It is not denied or disputed that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Datia court. Section 177 of the Code ordains that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
8. Interpretation of the term “ordinarily” will have to be considered having regard to the provisions contained in Section 178 thereof which read as under:
“178. Place of inquiry or trial.-(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”
9. Clause (c) of the said provision, thus, has been applied in the instant case.
10. Whether the allegations made in the complaint petition would constitute a continuing offence, thus, is the core question.
11. In a case of this nature, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing one, only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home.”
7. In view of the legal and factual position, this petition is allowed. The order impugned, by which the learned S.D.J.M., Ranchi found a prima facie case against the petitioners for the alleged offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained under law as the same was recorded without considering that no part of the alleged act did take place in his territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, such order and the entire criminal prosecution of the petitioners in Complaint Case No.664 /07 are set aside, however, with the liberty to the complainant-opposite party No.2 to file any such complaint in the court of competent territorial jurisdiction.
(D.K. Sinha, J.) S.B./A.F.R.
2) Rudrakant Jha& oRS Vs State of Jharkhand
In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi
Cr.M.P. No.1204 of 2007
Rudra Kant Jha and others...............Petitioners
VERSUS
State of Jharkhand and another...........Opposite Parties
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.R.PRASAD
For the Petitioners: Mr.Rajesh Kumar
For the State :A.P.P
For the Opp.Party no.2: : Mr. S.K.Dubey
13/ 7.5.12
. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.2.
The order dated 18.1.2007 passed by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ghatsila in complaint case bearing C/1no. 107 of 2006 is being sought to be quashed on the ground that the court does not have any territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as the cause of action never arose at the place where the complaint was filed.
From perusal of the complaint petition, it does appear that whatever overt act constituting an offence alleged was allegedly committed at Mohallah Rashikpur falling within the jurisdiction of District-Dumka whereas the complaint was filed at Ghatshila. Under this situation, the court at Ghatshila will have no jurisdiction to entertain the application or to take cognizance of the offences alleged, in view of the decision rendered in a case of Bhura Ram vs. State of Rajasthan [(2008) 11 SCC 103 (SC)] and also in a case of Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police [(2004) 8 SCC 100].
Accordingly, the order dated 18.1.2007 passed by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ghatshila is hereby quashed.
However, the opposite party no.2 would be at liberty to invoke the provision as contained in Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by approaching the court to get the complaint returned for presentation to the proper court within an endorsement to that effect. If resort is made to that provision, necessary order be passed.
With the aforesaid observation, this application stands disposed of.
3)Satyendra Kumar vs state of Jharkhand
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.1058 of 2010
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1. Jayshree Devi, Wife of late Ram Narayan Bhagat.
2. Ajay Bhagat, Son of late Ram Narayan Bhagat.
3. Vijay Bhagat, Son of late Ram Narayan Bhagat.
4. Smt. Santoshi Devi, Wife of Vijay Bhagat.
5. Manju Devi, Wife of Ajay Bhagat.
All residents of village-Torapa, Church Road, P.O. P.S. Torapa,
District-Khuti.
6. Sunita Devi @ Sunita Jaiswal, Wife of Krishan Kumar Jaiswal,
Resident of Alkapuri, Ratu Road, P.O. P.S. Alkapuri, Ranchi.
7. Sangita Devi @ Sangita Jaiswal, Wife of Anil Kumar Jaiswal,
Resident of Lubi Circular Road, P.O. P.S. & District-Dhanbad.
.....Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Priti Devi, Wife of Satendra Kumar, Daughter of Jai Prakash
Jaiswal, Resident of Mohala-Shahpur, P.O. P.S. Chainpur,
District-Palamau.
....Opposite Parties
With
Cr.M.P. No.70 of 2011
Satyendra Kumar, S//o late Ram Narayan Bhagat, Resident of Village-
Torpa, P.O P.S. Torpa, District-Khunti.
.........Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Priti Devi, Wife of Satendra Kumar, Daughter of Jai Prakash
Jaiswal, Resident of Mohala-Shahpur, P.O. P.S. Chainpur,
District-Palamau.
....Opposite Parties
-----
Coram: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY
-----
For the Petitioners : Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, Sr. Advocate
For the State : Mrs. Lily Sahay, APP
For O.P. No. 2 : Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha, Advocate
-----
10/28.03.2016
In this application, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case No. 496 of 2009, including the order dated 2.9.2009 , passed by Shri A. Verma, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Daltonganj, whereby and whereunder cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. A complaint petition was instituted by the opposite party no. 2, wherein it was stated that her marriage was solemnized with Satendra Kumar (petitioner in Cr. M.P. No. 70 of 2011) on 4.7.2013 at Aurangabad in the district of Khunti. It has been alleged that in her matrimonial house, the complainant was subjected to torture for non fulfillment of demand of dowry. It has been stated therein that on account of pressure created by the accused persons, some amounts were paid to the accused persons by the father of the complainant as well by the brother of the complainant. Allegation has also been levelled that in spite of fulfilling the demands made by the accused persons, the torture continued upon the complainant and further amounts were demanded. The complainant having no other alternative left her matrimonial house with her child and thereafter the husband of the complainant had threatened her over telephone. Based on the aforesaid allegations, complaint case no. 496 of 1999 was instituted. Upon conducting an enquiry by examining the complainant on solemn affirmation as well as her witnesses, cognizance was taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Daltonganj on 2.9.2009 for the offence punishable under sections 498A of Indian Penal Code and 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
3. Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, learned senior counsel for the petitioners , has submitted that so far as the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No. 1058 of 2010 is concerned, vague and omnibus allegations have been levelled against them. It has been submitted that the entire occurrence is said to have taken place in the district of Khunti whereas the case was deliberately instituted at Daltonganj and therefore since the Court at Daltonganj does not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case, the entire criminal proceedings deserves to be quashed and set aside. It has also been submitted that the allegations made by the complainant have been falsified by the report of the State Women Commission, in which while acting in the complaint made by the opposite party no. 2, the allegations were verified and subsequently it was found that no case of torture is made out against the accused persons on account of non fulfillment of dowry. Learned senior counsel has also referred to the report of the Subdivisional Officer, Khunti, wherein the allegations were considered and it was stated therein that the opposite party no. 2 does not want to stay with the petitioner. It has been submitted that the report submitted by the State Women Commission as well as Sub divisional Officer, Khunti goes to suggest that it is a malicious prosecution, which has been thrust upon the petitioners and therefore the criminal prosecution against the petitioners cannot be allowed to be continued.
4. Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 , has submitted that the report of State Women Commission cannot be taken note of in view of the fact that the member who had passed the order is the wife of cousin brother of the petitioner in Cr. M. P. No. 70 of 2011. It has been submitted that only in order to cover up the guilt of the petitioners, State Women Commission had passed the order dated 19.06.2009. It has also been submitted that so far as the question of territorial jurisdiction is concerned in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since ouster of the complainant from her matrimonial house and mental torture, which she was subjected to and which has been a consequence of her ouster is a continuing offence and therefore the Court at Daltonganj did have the jurisdiction to try the case. It has further been submitted that in the complaint petition, specific allegations have been levelled against all the accused persons and therefore considering the entire aspects of the matter, the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioners requires to be decided in the trial and these applications are therefore liable to be dismissed.
5. Since the main issue which has been raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners with respect to territorial jurisdiction and which has been refuted by the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 taking shelter of Sections 178 and 179 of Code of Criminal Procedure, it would be necessary to deal with the said aspects at the initial stage as the other contentions raised by the petitioners can be considered only after it is finally decided by this Court as to whether the Court at Daltonganj had the territorial jurisdiction to try the case or not.
6. The complaint petition reveals that after the marriage of the complainant was solemnized with the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No. 70 of 2011 there was a continuous and unabated demand of dowry and although specific demands were fulfilled but further demands were made and on such non fulfillment, the complainant was physically and mentally tortured, which compelled her to leave her matrimonial house at Daltonganj. It is, therefore, evident from a bare perusal of the complaint petition that none of the incidents, which are alleged to have taken place had happened at Daltonganj. The torture and demand of dowry during intermittent periods had continued at Khunti. So far as the husband of the complainant is concerned, there is an allegation of giving threat over telephone that physical harm shall be caused and the complainant shall be defamed in the Society. The allegation so far as the husband is concerned, threatening of dire consequences is the only allegation, which can be said to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Daltonganj Court. However, the said telephonic conversation does not relate to any demand of dowry and therefore it seems to have been inserted in the complaint petition only to create a jurisdiction in the Court at Daltonganj.
7. Learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 has vehemently argued about continuing offence in terms of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 178 of Cr.P. C. depicts the place of inquiry or trial and if an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another or where an offence is a continuing one, the same may be enquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Section 179 of Cr.P.C. deals with the offence, which can be tried at the place where the act is done or at a place where the consequence has ensued. Learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 had submitted that stay of the complainant in her parental house is a consequence of her being forced to leave her matrimonial house and such circumstances do create the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Daltonganj. The question of continuing offence or the consequence of an act, which has been done and which can be tried by the Court where such consequence ensues has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Amarendu Jyoti Vs. State of Chhatisgarh, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 362, wherein it was held as follows:-
“11. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do not agree with the High Court that in this case the mental cruelty inflicted upon Respondent 2 “continued unabated” on account of no effort having been made by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and the threats given by the appellants over the telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High Court does not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding the threats said to have been given by the appellants over the telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we are of the view that it cannot be held that the Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate Court at Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.”
8. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case referred to above and juxtaposing the same with the factual matrix as enumerated in the complaint petition do suggest that the offence as alleged by the complainant cannot be said to be a continuing offence and therefore the jurisdiction of the Court at Daltonganj is automatically ousted. No cause of action had arisen at Daltonganj save and except a telephonic call made by the husband of the complainant which also does not relate to the demand of dowry and the entire occurrence as alleged had taken place in the district at Khunti and therefore continuation of criminal proceeding as against the petitioners at Daltonganj will be a miscarriage of justice and therefore the same requires to be corrected.
9. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case No. 496 of 2009, including the order dated 2.9.2009 , passed by Shri A. Verma, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Daltonganj, by which cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, are hereby quashed and set aside. The complainant is, however, at liberty to present the complaint before the appropriate Court, which has the territorial jurisdiction to try the case.
10. Since the proceedings in connection with C.P. Case No. 496 of 2009 has been quashed on the basis that the Court at Daltonganj does not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case, the other contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners have not been gone into in this order.
11. These applications are allowed and disposed of.
(Rongon Mukhopadhyay,J) Rakesh/
3.Satyendra Kumar vs state of Jharkhand
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.1058 of 2010
-----------
1. Jayshree Devi, Wife of late Ram Narayan Bhagat.
2. Ajay Bhagat, Son of late Ram Narayan Bhagat.
3. Vijay Bhagat, Son of late Ram Narayan Bhagat.
4. Smt. Santoshi Devi, Wife of Vijay Bhagat.
5. Manju Devi, Wife of Ajay Bhagat.
All residents of village-Torapa, Church Road, P.O. P.S. Torapa,
District-Khuti.
6. Sunita Devi @ Sunita Jaiswal, Wife of Krishan Kumar Jaiswal,
Resident of Alkapuri, Ratu Road, P.O. P.S. Alkapuri, Ranchi.
7. Sangita Devi @ Sangita Jaiswal, Wife of Anil Kumar Jaiswal,
Resident of Lubi Circular Road, P.O. P.S. & District-Dhanbad.
.....Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Priti Devi, Wife of Satendra Kumar, Daughter of Jai Prakash
Jaiswal, Resident of Mohala-Shahpur, P.O. P.S. Chainpur,
District-Palamau.
....Opposite Parties
With
Cr.M.P. No.70 of 2011
Satyendra Kumar, S//o late Ram Narayan Bhagat, Resident of Village-
Torpa, P.O P.S. Torpa, District-Khunti.
.........Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Priti Devi, Wife of Satendra Kumar, Daughter of Jai Prakash
Jaiswal, Resident of Mohala-Shahpur, P.O. P.S. Chainpur,
District-Palamau.
....Opposite Parties
-----
Coram: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY
-----
For the Petitioners : Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, Sr. Advocate
For the State : Mrs. Lily Sahay, APP
For O.P. No. 2 : Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha, Advocate
-----
10/28.03.2016
In this application, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case No. 496 of 2009, including the order dated 2.9.2009 , passed by Shri A. Verma, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Daltonganj, whereby and whereunder cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. A complaint petition was instituted by the opposite party no. 2, wherein it was stated that her marriage was solemnized with Satendra Kumar (petitioner in Cr. M.P. No. 70 of 2011) on 4.7.2013 at Aurangabad in the district of Khunti. It has been alleged that in her matrimonial house, the complainant was subjected to torture for non fulfillment of demand of dowry. It has been stated therein that on account of pressure created by the accused persons, some amounts were paid to the accused persons by the father of the complainant as well by the brother of the complainant. Allegation has also been levelled that in spite of fulfilling the demands made by the accused persons, the torture continued upon the complainant and further amounts were demanded. The complainant having no other alternative left her matrimonial house with her child and thereafter the husband of the complainant had threatened her over telephone. Based on the aforesaid allegations, complaint case no. 496 of 1999 was instituted. Upon conducting an enquiry by examining the complainant on solemn affirmation as well as her witnesses, cognizance was taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Daltonganj on 2.9.2009 for the offence punishable under sections 498A of Indian Penal Code and 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
3. Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, learned senior counsel for the petitioners , has submitted that so far as the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No. 1058 of 2010 is concerned, vague and omnibus allegations have been levelled against them. It has been submitted that the entire occurrence is said to have taken place in the district of Khunti whereas the case was deliberately instituted at Daltonganj and therefore since the Court at Daltonganj does not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case, the entire criminal proceedings deserves to be quashed and set aside. It has also been submitted that the allegations made by the complainant have been falsified by the report of the State Women Commission, in which while acting in the complaint made by the opposite party no. 2, the allegations were verified and subsequently it was found that no case of torture is made out against the accused persons on account of non fulfillment of dowry. Learned senior counsel has also referred to the report of the Subdivisional Officer, Khunti, wherein the allegations were considered and it was stated therein that the opposite party no. 2 does not want to stay with the petitioner. It has been submitted that the report submitted by the State Women Commission as well as Sub divisional Officer, Khunti goes to suggest that it is a malicious prosecution, which has been thrust upon the petitioners and therefore the criminal prosecution against the petitioners cannot be allowed to be continued.
4. Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 , has submitted that the report of State Women Commission cannot be taken note of in view of the fact that the member who had passed the order is the wife of cousin brother of the petitioner in Cr. M. P. No. 70 of 2011. It has been submitted that only in order to cover up the guilt of the petitioners, State Women Commission had passed the order dated 19.06.2009. It has also been submitted that so far as the question of territorial jurisdiction is concerned in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since ouster of the complainant from her matrimonial house and mental torture, which she was subjected to and which has been a consequence of her ouster is a continuing offence and therefore the Court at Daltonganj did have the jurisdiction to try the case. It has further been submitted that in the complaint petition, specific allegations have been levelled against all the accused persons and therefore considering the entire aspects of the matter, the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioners requires to be decided in the trial and these applications are therefore liable to be dismissed.
5. Since the main issue which has been raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners with respect to territorial jurisdiction and which has been refuted by the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 taking shelter of Sections 178 and 179 of Code of Criminal Procedure, it would be necessary to deal with the said aspects at the initial stage as the other contentions raised by the petitioners can be considered only after it is finally decided by this Court as to whether the Court at Daltonganj had the territorial jurisdiction to try the case or not.
6. The complaint petition reveals that after the marriage of the complainant was solemnized with the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No. 70 of 2011 there was a continuous and unabated demand of dowry and although specific demands were fulfilled but further demands were made and on such non fulfillment, the complainant was physically and mentally tortured, which compelled her to leave her matrimonial house at Daltonganj. It is, therefore, evident from a bare perusal of the complaint petition that none of the incidents, which are alleged to have taken place had happened at Daltonganj. The torture and demand of dowry during intermittent periods had continued at Khunti. So far as the husband of the complainant is concerned, there is an allegation of giving threat over telephone that physical harm shall be caused and the complainant shall be defamed in the Society. The allegation so far as the husband is concerned, threatening of dire consequences is the only allegation, which can be said to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Daltonganj Court. However, the said telephonic conversation does not relate to any demand of dowry and therefore it seems to have been inserted in the complaint petition only to create a jurisdiction in the Court at Daltonganj.
7. Learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 has vehemently argued about continuing offence in terms of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 178 of Cr.P. C. depicts the place of inquiry or trial and if an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another or where an offence is a continuing one, the same may be enquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Section 179 of Cr.P.C. deals with the offence, which can be tried at the place where the act is done or at a place where the consequence has ensued. Learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 had submitted that stay of the complainant in her parental house is a consequence of her being forced to leave her matrimonial house and such circumstances do create the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Daltonganj. The question of continuing offence or the consequence of an act, which has been done and which can be tried by the Court where such consequence ensues has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Amarendu Jyoti Vs. State of Chhatisgarh, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 362, wherein it was held as follows:-
“11. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do not agree with the High Court that in this case the mental cruelty inflicted upon Respondent 2 “continued unabated” on account of no effort having been made by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and the threats given by the appellants over the telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High Court does not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding the threats said to have been given by the appellants over the telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we are of the view that it cannot be held that the Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate Court at Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.”
8. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case referred to above and juxtaposing the same with the factual matrix as enumerated in the complaint petition do suggest that the offence as alleged by the complainant cannot be said to be a continuing offence and therefore the jurisdiction of the Court at Daltonganj is automatically ousted. No cause of action had arisen at Daltonganj save and except a telephonic call made by the husband of the complainant which also does not relate to the demand of dowry and the entire occurrence as alleged had taken place in the district at Khunti and therefore continuation of criminal proceeding as against the petitioners at Daltonganj will be a miscarriage of justice and therefore the same requires to be corrected.
9. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case No. 496 of 2009, including the order dated 2.9.2009 , passed by Shri A. Verma, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Daltonganj, by which cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, are hereby quashed and set aside. The complainant is, however, at liberty to present the complaint before the appropriate Court, which has the territorial jurisdiction to try the case.
10. Since the proceedings in connection with C.P. Case No. 496 of 2009 has been quashed on the basis that the Court at Daltonganj does not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case, the other contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners have not been gone into in this order.
11. These applications are allowed and disposed of.
(Rongon Mukhopadhyay,J) Rakesh/
4) Ranjeet Mahato vs state of Jharkhand and anr
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
Cr. M. P. No. 1819 of 2012
1.Ranjeet Mahto
2.Devi Mahto
3.Janki Devi @ Jayanti Devi
4.Lilavati Devi
5.Pawan Mahto @ Pawan Yadav
6.Usha Kumari ..... Petitioner(s)
Versus
1.The State of Jharkhand
2.Sabita Devi .... Opp. Party(s)
CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. R. PRASAD
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rajan Raj, Advocate.
For the State : A.P.P.
-----
05 /3.04.2013
. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and learned counsel appearing for the State.
The order dated 12.06.2012 passed in Complaint Case being C.P. Case No.596 of 2010 by the then learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Giridih, under which cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 498A /323 of the Indian Penal Code has been taken against the petitioners is being sought to be quashed on the ground that the court who has taken cognizance of the offence lacks territorial jurisdiction.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that from the perusal of the complaint petition, it does appear that whatever overt acts attracting under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code have been alleged to have been committed, those have been committed at Village :-Chihutia, Kendua Tar, P.S.-Margomunda, Distt :- Deoghar, whereas, the complaint has been lodged at Giridih and the court at Giridih has taken cognizance of the offence though he had had no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and, therefore, the order taking cognizance being bad is fit to be quashed.
Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and on perusal of the record, I do find that whatever occurrences have taken place, those have taken place at Village :- Chihutia, Kendua Tar, Deoghar, falling within the District of Deoghar and, therefore, the court at Giridih will have no jurisdiction to entertain this complaint, in view of the decision rendered in a case of Bhura Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan {2008 [11] SCC 103} and also in a case of Y. Abraham Ajith Vs. Inspector of Police {2004 [8] SCC 100], wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the court, at the place where no cause of action has ever accrued, does not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.
Here in the instant case also, no cause of action seems to have ever accrued at Giridih and, therefore, the court at Giridih had absolutely no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.
Under the circumstances, the order taking cognizance dated 12.06.2012 passed in Complaint Case being C.P. Case No.596 of 2010, is hereby quashed, so far the present six petitioners are concerned.
However, the complainant would be at liberty to invoke the provision as contained in Section 201 of the Cr.P.C. by approaching the court to get the complaint returned for presentation to the proper court with an endorsement to that effect. If resort is made to that provision, necessary order be passed.
With these observations, this application stands disposed of,.
(R. R. Prasad, J.) Sandeep/
5. Onkar Nath Pandey vs the state of Jharkhand
Jharkhand High Court
Onkar Nath Pandey Alias Dipu Alias … vs State Of Jharkhand And Anr on 19 February, 2014
In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi
Cr.M.P. No.1100 of 2013
1. Onkar Nath Pandey @ Dipu @ Jhagru Pandey
2. Akhilesh Kumar Pandey
3. Geeta Devi
4. Menka Pandey @ Baby ………………… Petitioners
VERSUS
State of Jharkhand and another……….Opposite Parties
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R.R.PRASAD
For the Petitioners: Mr.P.C.Tripathy, Sr. Advocate
For the State : A.P.P
For the O.P.No.2 : Mr. Rajan Raj, Advocate
03/ 19.02.14
. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.2.
The order dated 7.1.2013 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Latehar in Complaint Case No.45 of 2012 under which cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 498A, 323, 379 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code has been taken against the petitioners is being sought to be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
It is the case of the complainant that the complainant had married to one Himanshu Pandey, who unfortunately died within a month of the marriage. After Shradh ceremony was over, the accused persons conveyed to the parents of the complainant that they need not to worry as they are ready to get his second son Onkar Nath Pandey married to the complainant. After a year, the complainant married with Onkar Nath Pandey in February, 2005 after observing all rituals. Since then, she was living with Onkar Nath Pandey as wife and husband. Till 2010, she lived in her in-laws’ place quite happily. When she did not bear any child, relationship in between the wife and husband and even with the in-laws became strained and they started saying that they will be getting his son married with another woman and they started forcing the complainant to go to her parents’ house. She was being not only subjecting to assault and abuses but were being not provided with cloths and thereby all kinds of torture were being inflicted upon her.
Further case is that parents of Onkar Nath Pandey even fixed the marriage of Onkar Nath Pandey with another woman. When the complainant did not agree to go back to the parents’ house, the accused persons even tried to strangulate her to death and they took away all her ornaments and the money. Thereafter Onkar Nath Pandey took her to Latehar and left her there.
On such accusation, a complaint was lodged as Complaint Case No.45 of 2012 under Sections 498A, 323, 379, 504 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court after holding enquiry took cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 379 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners, vide order dated 7.1.2013. That order has been challenged to be bad on account of the fact that the court which has taken cognizance lacks territorial jurisdiction.
Mr.P.C.Tripathy, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that whatever acts constituting offence either under Section 498A or other offences under which cognizance has been taken, have been alleged to have been committed, those overt acts have been committed at Kushinagar and not at the place where the complaint was filed and thereby the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, in view of the decision rendered in a case of Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police [(2004) 8 SCC 100] and also in a case of Bhura Ram vs. State of Rajasthan [(2008) 11 SCC 103].
As against this, Mr.Rajan Raj, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.2 submits that it is true that all the acts relating to physical cruelty were committed at Kushinagar but mental cruelty can be said to have been inflicted to the complainant at Latehar where Onkar Nath Pandey brought the complainant and left her and therefore, part of the cause of action can certainly be said to have accrued at Latehar. In that event, the court cannot be said to have committed any illegality in taking cognizance of the offences.
Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and on perusal of the record, I do find that allegation seems to be there of subjecting her to assault and other kinds of torture but it never appears to be the case of the prosecution that such infliction of torture was on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. However, it was submitted on behalf of the opposite party no.2 that even if such allegation of demand of dowry is not there, the case would fall within the second limb of Section 498A as the complainant was even attempted to be murdered but for that also whatever act was committed, that was committed at Kushinagar and not at Latehar. The case seems to have been filed at Latehar as Onkar Nath Pandey said to have brought the complainant to Latehar and left her there but no such allegation is there to the effect that any demand was made at Latehar or she was subjected to torture at Latehar which are two main ingredients for attracting offence under Section 498A and therefore, cause of action can never be said to have accrued at Latehar.
In such event, the order taking cognizance cannot be sustained in view of the decision rendered in a case of Bhura Ram vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) and also in a case of Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that only that court within those territorial jurisdiction cause of action accrued would be competent to take cognizance of the offence.
Thus, I do find that the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences and thereby the order taking cognizance is hereby quashed.
In the result, this application stands allowed.
(R.R. Prasad, J.) ND/
6) Shakeel Ahamed vs State of Jharkhand
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.1091 of 2009
1. Shakil Ahmed
2. Shaukat @ Shaukat Ali
3. Md. Islam
4. Sufia Khatoon
5. Abdul Rab
6. Khursida Bano
7. Alia Khatoon
8. Shamshad Bano @ Shamshad
9. Ishaque Ahmed @ Asfaque Ahmed
10. Saleha Khatoon
11. Ayasha Khatoon @ Chamni- - -- -- -- -- ---Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand
2. Nikhat Parween -- --Opposite Parties
CORAM : THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE D.K. SINHA
For the Petitioners : M/s. Abhijeet Kumar Singh & Rajesh Kr., Advocates
For the State : Mr. Md. Hatim, A.P.P.
For the Opp. Party No.2 : Mr. Jai Prakash, Sr. Advocate
-----
Reserved on: 5-1-2011 Pronounced on: 02- 02-2011
D.K. Sinha, J. Petitioners have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashment of the entire
criminal proceedings including the order impugned dated 13.12.2000 by
which Shri S.K. Upadhyay, Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi found prima facie
offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the
petitioners.
2. Prosecution story in short was that the complainant- Nikhat Parween
opposite party No.2 herein was married to the petitioner No.1 Shakil
Ahmed and two children were born to them from their wedlock. At the time
of Nikah, Dainmehr was fixed at Rs.10,000/- with Dinars but the same
could never be paid to her. Besides, jewelleries made of gold and silver,
various costly articles and gifts were presented to the complainant on the
eve of her marriage and she had carried all those items with her to
matrimonial home at Rajganjpur. It was alleged that the petitioner-
husband demanded cash of Rs.40,000/- from the complainant to be
brought from her parental home on the pretext that he had to start his
business and in that process, all his relatives joined him and subjected her
2
to torture in various ways. However, a sum of Rs.15,000/- was given to
her husband in the expectation of better future of the complainant, but her
miseries did not end here. She was driven out by the accused persons
from her matrimonial home and since then she was living and leading a
hapless life at Ranchi along with her minor children.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that
during the period of litigation between the parties compromise was
effected, accordingly, a joint compromise petition was filed on 6.4.2002
which contained one of the terms that the husband-petitioner No.1 would
provide Rs.1200/- as her monthly maintenance and husband-petitioner
No.1 is continuing by paying the amount to the complainant and pursuant
to such terms contained in the agreement the parties expressed to
withdraw their cases, which they had filed against each other, including
the present case.
4. The complaint petition was filed in the year 2000 and after inquiry having
been found prima facie case for the offence under Section 498A of the
Indian Penal Code, notices were directed to be issued to the petitioners by
the impugned order dated 13.12.2000.
5. Raising the point of jurisdiction, the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, at the outset submitted that no part of the occurrence took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi
and the complainant in her complaint petition admitted that torture was
extended to her at her matrimonial home situated at Rajganjpur, P.S.
Rajganjpur, District- Sundergarh within the State of Orissa where she lived
with her husband and two children were born from their wedlock. Demand
of money to the tune of Rs.40,000/- was made by the husband at
Rajganjpur and the allegation of torture in connection with alleged demand
also took place at Rajganjpur.
6. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Bhura Ram and others versus State of
Rajasthan and another, reported in (2008)11 Supreme Court Cases 103,
observed,
"The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the
complainant left the place where she was residing with her
husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri
Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts
as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab.
The court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal
with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario
disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable
conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in
Rajasthan and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no
jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As a consequence
thereof, the proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be
returned to the complainant and if she so wishes she may
file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in
accordance with law."
3
7. Learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. Jai Prakash, appearing on behalf of the opposite
party No.2, has not disputed the legal position and proposition made by
the Apex Court in Bhura Ram and others versus State of Rajasthan and
another (supra).
8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and admitted
legal position, this petition is allowed and the order impugned dated
13.12.2000
, by which prima facie allegation under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was found against the accused petitioners by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi in Complaint Case No.85/2000, is set aside since barred by territorial jurisdiction.
9. It is made clear that this order will not stand in any way in filing a fresh complaint by the complainant-opposite party No.2 before a court of competent jurisdiction.
7)Debabrata saha vs state of Jharkhand
JUDGMENT D.G.R. Patnaik, J.
Page 1324
1. The petitioners have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of he Code of Criminal Procedure, praying for quashing the entire criminal proceeding initialed against them vide C.P. Case No. 445 of 2005 and the order dated 06.07.2005b whereby learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad has taken cognizance for the offences under Section 498 IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the petitioners and summons were issued directing their appearance for facing trial.
2. The main ground advanced by the petitioners is the ground relating to jurisdiction, claiming that the learned court below did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Page 1325 complaint of the opposite party No. 2 for initiating proceedings against the petitioners on account of the fact that no cause of action arose or accrued to the complainant within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned court below.
3. Facts of the case briefly stated is that the complainant/opposite party No. 2 filed a complaint petition in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad naming the present petitioners as accused alleging inter-alia that her marriage with the petitioner No. 1 was solemnized on 19th November 2003 in the house of the complainant’s father at Dhanbad pursuant to negotiation between their respective elders. After her marriage, she went to live at her matrimonial house in the company of her husband and in-laws at Calcutta, West Bengal. On account of the alleged non-fulfillment of demand of down, her husband and in-laws began subjecting her to ill treatment and cruelty at her matrimonial house with further threats of divorce, if their demands were not fulfilled. Four months after the marriage, she came to her paternal house at Dhanbad for completing her academic courses. After about seven months she went back to her matrimonial house and during her sojourn at her matrimonial house, she again faced ill treatment, neglect and cruelty at the hands of her husband and in-laws. She was thus compelled to leave her matrimonial house and return to the house of her parents. During the period of her stay at her parent’s house, her husband used to make frequent telephonic calls giving out abuses to her and threatening that he would enforce divorce and go for second marriage if the demanded amount of dowry is not given. Instilled with fear on account of the threats issued to her, the complainant did not go back to her matrimonial house ever since after she had returned to the house of her parents.
4. Mr. Rajan Raj, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that the complaint as filed by the opposite party No. 2, is entirely with malafide intentions only to harass the petitioners and by suppressing the material facts that the petitioner No. 1/ husband had filed a matrimonial suit for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act against the complainant / opposite party No. 2 which was registered as Matrimonial Suit No. 85 of 2005 in the court of District Judge, Hooghly, Chinsura, West Bengal on the ground of cruelty and desertion. Learned Counsel explains that the opposite party No. 2 had voluntarily withdrawn herself from the company of her husband and had left her matrimonial house on 8.2.2004 and since then, she had never returned to her matrimonial house. Referring to the allegations in the complaint petition, learned Counsel explains that the allegation of misbehaviour, neglect and cruelty, as levelled by the opposite party No. 2 against the petitioners, relates to the period when the complainant was admittedly living at her matrimonial house at Calcutta and in absence of any allegation of such misconduct occurring at Dhanbad, the learned court below at Dhanbad had no jurisdiction at all to proceed with the trial against the petitioners on the basis of such complaint. Referring in this context to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Abraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai reported in 2005(1) J C R 15 (SC), learned Counsel explains that as envisaged under Section 177 Cr. PC, the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which are alleged to constitute the crime. Learned Counsel explains that since it is the definite case of the complainant that the alleged ads and deeds constituting offences had occurred exclusively at Calcutta, where cause of action allegedly arose and therefore, it is the court at Calcutta which alone had jurisdiction Page 1326 to entertain the complaint and not the court at Dhanbad. Learned Counsel explains further that the provision of Section 178 Cr. PC also cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Referring to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. , learned Counsel submits that none of the offences for which cognizance was taken in the instant case, can be deemed to be a continuing offence, since the definition or explanation of the term “continuing offence” as given in Section 178(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Learned Counsel sums up asserting that since no part of the cause of action had accrued to the complainant at Dhanbad, the proceeding initiated by her in the court below at Dhanbad, is entirely an abuse of the process of law.
5. Opposite party No. 2 has appeared though her lawyer and has filed her counter-affidavit. Mr. Deepak Kumar, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, while controverting the grounds advanced by the petitioners and refuting their allegations, submits that the petitioners have tried to misinterpret the fact of the case ignoring certain part of the allegations appearing in the complaint petition. Learned Counsel explains that though complainant had suffered major portion of ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of the petitioners at her matrimonial house at Calcutta, but her suffering of cruelty had continued even while she was living at the house of her parents at Dhanbad on account of the fact that the husband/petitioner No. 1 used to make frequent telephonic calls giving out abuses and threatening her with the consequence of divorce. Furthermore, it was in response to the persistent demands of money, as made by the petitioners, the complainant’s lather had paid a sum of Rs. 2.00 lakh by two separate demand drafts of Rs. 1.00 lakh each drawn at Dhanbad Central Cooperative Bank Limited, Hirapur, Dhanbad and UCO Bank, Hirapur, Dhanbad in favour of the petitioner No. 1, who on receipt of the same, had encashed the amounts thereof. Learned Counsel insists that in view of the above facts, part of the cause of action arose at Dhanbad also and applying the principles of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court at Dhanbad did definitely have jurisdiction not only to entertain the complaint, but also to proceed against the petitioners since cognizance of the offences was taken against them after finding a prima facie case.
6. The question which calls for determination is, whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the court below at Dhanbad has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the opposite party No. 2 and to proceed with the trial against the petitioners on such complaint. Related issue is, whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the learned court below. This issue invites necessarily reference to Sections 177, 178 and 179 Cr. PC. Section 177 Cr. PC deals with the ordinary place of inquiry and trial and reads as under:
177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.- (a) Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose jurisdiction it was committed.
Section 178 Cr. PC deals with the place of inquiry or trial and reads as under:
178. Place of inquiry or trial.- (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or Page 1327
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
Section 179 Cr. PC reads as follows:
179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues: When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.
7. It is apparent from the above sections of procedural law that the place of inquiry or trial depends upon the place or places where offence was committed or where offence is a continuing one giving cause of action to the aggrieved party to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for his or her redressal.
In the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. (Supra), the Apex Court while elaborating that the term “Cause of Action” has explained that the term consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redressal in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “cause of action” to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim. In common legal parlance it is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.
8. Referring to the averments contained in the complaint petition read together with the statement of the complainant recorded on solemn affirmation in course of inquiry conducted by the learned court below under Section 202 Cr. PC, it appears that the allegations of demand for dowry and of subjecting her to ill-treatment for nonfulfillment of demand, is confined entirely to the period during which the complainant/opposite party No. 2 lived at her matrimonial house at Calcutta. Admittedly, she had left her matrimonial house and returned to the house of her parents at Dhanbad on 20.3.2004, where after, she never returned to her matrimonial house, nor does she claim to have any occasion thereafter to come in contact with her husband or with any member of his family. Though, in para-2 of the complaint petition, it has been claimed that two demand drafts of Rupees one lakh each vide dated 26.11.2003 and 01.12.2003 respectively, along with gold ornaments, furniture, utensils and clothing apparel were given by the complainant’s father at the time of marriage besides a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the marriage broker towards their services for negotiating the marriage, but no such statement appears in the statement of the complainant recorded on solemn affirmation. Even otherwise, it is not the case of the complainant that any ill treatment or cruelty or any act constituting the offence under Section 498A IPC had occurred at the time when the marriage was solemnized. Rather, it was admittedly a negotiated marriage agreed upon after both the parties had discussed all related matters in advance. Learned Counsel for the petitioners informs that as per bank’s statement, the demand drafts referred to in the complaint petition, are of 12.8.2003 and 13.08.2003, which relate to the period prior to the date of solemnization of marriage. In this background, the contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 that since the demand drafts were drawn in favour of the petitioner No. 1 at Page 1328 the banks at Dhanbad, the same constitute part of cause of action at Dhanbad, also appears to be misconceived and not applicable. Likewise, the contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 that the petitioners used to give out abuses by making telephonic calls to the complainant at Dhanbad, is also not supported by the facts admitted and stated by the complainant in her complaint petition. The Statements contained in Para-11 of the complaint petition which refers to the purported telephonic calls, suggests that it was the complainant and her witnesses who used to make the telephonic calls to the petitioners at their house at Calcutta, requesting them to take back the complainant to her matrimonial house and the petitioners used to respond by referring the request and way of giving out abuses. The above averment do not suggest anywhere that the petitioners had ever initiated any telephonic calls to the complainant or had threatened her and her parents with any specific demand. Refusal of the petitioners to accede to the requests in itself cannot be construed as a continuing offence or a conduct consequence of which was suffered by the complainant at the house of her parents at Dhanbad. It cannot, therefore, be said that the circumstances as envisaged under Section 178 or 179 Cr. PC can be attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The facts of the case of K.C. Mathew and Anr. v. Reena Paul reported in 1998 Cr. L.J. 2300 (Kerala) can be distinguishable from the facts of the present case. For the same reason, the benefit of Section 182 Cr. PC, which deals with the place of inquiry or trial in respect of offence committed by telecommunication message, also does not apply in the present case.
10. From the facts and circumstances of the present case and regard being had to the factual matrix, as stated by the complainant/opposite party No. 2 in her complaint petition, it is apparent that no part of cause of action arose at Dhanbad and, therefore, concerned Magistrate before whom the criminal proceeding was initiated by the opposite party No. 2 and before whom same is pending, had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
11. Under the circumstances, the entire criminal proceedings against the petitioners vide C.P. Case No. 445 of 2005 and order dated 06.07.2005 passed therein by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, is hereby quashed.
8) Amit Kumar Gupta &anr vs State Of Jharkhand
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P.No.1499 of 2007
1. Amit Kumar Gupta.
2. Amresh Chand Gupta. ... ... ...Petitioners
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Ram Nath Gupta. ... .. ... ... ...Opp. Parties
With
Cr.M.P.No.1599 of 2007
1. Deepak Kumar Gupta.
2. Shiboo Gupta @ Shiboo Devi. ... ... ...Petitioners
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Ram Nath Gupta. ... ... ... ...Opp.Parties
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CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE D.K.SINHA For the Petitioners Mr. Mahesh Tiwary, Advocate.
(In both the Cr.M.Ps)
For the State: Mr. Md. Hatim, A.P.P.
For the O.P.No.2: Mr. V. Shivnath, Sr. Advocate.
(In Cr.M.P.No. 1499 of 2007)
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C.A.V. on 22.02.2011 : Pronounced on 11.07.2011
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D.K.Sinha,J. Both the petitions are taken up together arising out of Chandwa
P.S. Case No.90 of 2006, corresponding to G.R.No.363 of 2006 for the alleged offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code as also under Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Actfor the common cause of action against the petitioners brought about by the informant O.P.No.2-Ram Nath Gupta.
2. The common issue in both the petitions is for quashment of the common First Information Report including the entire criminal proceeding of the petitioners, now pending before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Latehar.
3. The law was set in motion on the written report presented by the informant-Opposite Party No.2 before the Officer-in-Charge of Chandwa Police Station, Latehar narrating that he had married his daughter Priyanka Gupta with the petitioner Amit Kumar Gupta of village Dankinganj, P.S. Katra within the District of Mirjapur (U.P.) and after the marriage his daughter accompanied her husband to Mumbai where his son-in-law Amit Kumar Gupta was working at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Anusiki Nagar but soon thereafter it was alleged that his son-in-law started extending torture to her in various ways for dowry. The conduct of her husband was apprised by his daughter Priyaka Gupta and pursuant to her repeated appeals, he visited Mumbai on 08.04.206 but his Son-in-law refused to meet him and it was alleged that in his presence itself the petitioner-husband Amit Kumar Gupta threatened to commit murder of Priyanka lest the informant would deliver a sum of Rs. Two lakh in cash being the dowry. He tried to pacify the matter but of no avail. His other relations also came to Mumbai and tried to bring the normalcy in the family but the petitioner husband reiterated his demand in their presence also and sensing the gravity of situation he returned back to his village home Chandwa (Latehar) taking back his daughter Priyanka with him. After few days, the father of his son-in-law Amaresh Chand Gupta and his mother Shiva Devi telephoned him at Chandwa to return his daughter Priyanka with Rs.2 lakh so that she could be accepted in their family with dignity. Pursuant to such call, the informant went to Mirjapur and contacted his brother-in-law Ganesh Prasad Gupta, who had acted as middle man in arranging the marriage and both went to the matrimonial home of Priyanka. The informant explained sequence of events before the petitioner father-in- law and the mother-in-law that he had already spent according to his commitment and capacity yet he assured to fulfill part of their demand but they were consistent in their demand of Rs. 2 lakhs in cash. He attempted to convene a Panchayati on this issue with the assistance of common friends and relations but his Samdhi Amaresh Chand Gupta, son-in-law Amit Kumar Gupta, second son Deepak Kumar and his wife Shiva Devi refused to budge from their stand. The informant further alleged that his daughter went into mental depression on account of sufferings caused by her husband and in- laws and requested the police to take legal action.
4. Learned Counsel Mr. Mahesh Tiwari assisted by other lawyers raised the point of jurisdiction that no part of the occurrence as alleged took place within the territorial jurisdiction of Latehar for institution of the case and therefore the prosecution of the petitioner on the basis of the F.I.R. which was lodged at Chandwa was liable to be quashed. As per the version of the informant in the written report the entire occurrence as alleged took place either within the jurisdiction of Mumbai or at Mirjapur and the informant levelled omnibus allegations against all the petitioners including the father and mother of the husband, who were not at all beneficiary of the cash to the tune of Rs.2 lakh alleged to be demanded by son-in-law of the informant. As a matter of fact, the petitioner husband Amit Kumar Gupta consistently expressed his willingness and readiness to take back his wife to Mumbai, to which other petitioners had no objection as they also wanted that Priyanka Gupta should live her husband peacefully but only because of constant interference by her parents in her family affairs she had been compelled to lead a life of seclusion from her in-laws and the husband. As a matter of fact she herself did not want to live with her husband as she had expressed her dissatisfaction to the ugly look of her husband. The petitioners were unaware of the proceeding pending at Latehar. Virtually they were waiting for the return of Priyanka Gupta to her matrimonial home but the local police of Latehar went to Mumbai and apprehended the petitioner-husband Amit Kumar Gupta and his father and both were remanded to judicial custody on 14.10.2007.
5. In his counter-affidavit the informant Opposite Party No.2 herein contented that the F.I.R. which was lodged against the petitioner at Chandwa Police Station within the District of Latehar was still at the investigation stage. The incident of demand of dowry by the petitioners took place at Mumbai and at Chandwa both places which could be evident from the plain reading of the written report presented by him. The accused persons not only demanded dowry from his daughter but also humiliated and extended mental as well as physical torture and then she was driven out from Mumbai. It was purely a continuing offence which continued from Mirjapur to Mumbai and Mumbai to Chandwa in a sequence and the petitioner husband driven her out from his home at Mumbai with her father and finding no way out she returned to Chandwa where the petitioners also started making threatening calls on telephone to pay Rs. Two lakhs in cash lest his daughter would not be accepted at her matrimonial home and therefore, the continuing offence and its jurisdicticion would be covered under Section 178(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His daughter was forced to leave Mumbai and was living at Chandwa at her parental home as a consequence of the criminal act of his son-in-law and therefore, the harassment extended to the daughter was a contining harassment which resulted into her mental dpresssion at Chandwa. The petitioner No.2 being the father-in-law of the informant joined his hands with the petitioner No.1 in the act of harassment and cruelty in connection with demand of dowry and had made threatening call on phone which was received at Chandwa by the informant O.P.No.2 whereby demand of dowry was reiterated.
6. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners and the Opposite Party No.2, I find that the parties have raised the issue of territorial jurisdiction of the institution of case and thereby criminal proceeding of the petitioners. The petitioners have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for the quashment of the F.I.R. and their criminal proceeding on the ground that no part of the occurrence took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of Latehar and therefore, the F.I.R. registered by the Chandwa Police Station for its enquiry/trial by the Latehar Court was barred by Section 177 Code of Criminal Procedure as the Court at Latehar has no territorial jurisdiction to try such offence which took place in the District of Mirjapur (U.P.) and in Mumbai.
7. In Bhura Ram and others versus State of Rajasthan and another, reported in (2008) 11 Supreme Court Cases 103, the Apex Court of India held, “The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the complainant left the place where she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab. The court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As a consequence thereof, the proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be returned to the complainant and if she so wishes she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.”
8. The Supreme Court of India in Preeti Gupta and Anr. Vrs. State of Jharkhand & Anr, reported in 2010 STPL (Web) 602 S.C. held in the following manner:-
“Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly V. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions V. Humphrys [1977] AC 1 stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court’s power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved.”
9. From the plain reading of the entire F.I.R., other materials on the record, carbon copy of the case diary as also the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the informant-O.P.No.2, I find that no part of the occurrence took place within the jurisdiction of Chandwa Criminal Courts so as to accept registration of the F.I.R. at Chandwa Police Station. In the given facts and circumstances, I do not find that depiction of the occurrence at the behest of the informant makes out any continuing offence committed at Chandwa even by threatening call which he received at Chandwa. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is silent with respect to the territorial jurisdiction of the police station rather Section 177 and 178 Code of Criminal Procedure deal with the territorial jurisdiction of the Court within the limit of whose the offence may be enquired into and tried by the Court having territorial jurisdiction. It is settled that it was an erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well. The provisions of Section 177and 179 Code of Criminal Procedure did not tremble the powers of any Court to take cognizance of the offence and Section 177 which deals with ordinary place of enquiry and Trial, speaks:-
Every offence shall ordinary be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
Section 178 place of enquiry or trial;-
(a) when it is uncertain knowledge of every local area and offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas then one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be enquired into to tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any such local areas.
10. Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with information to the police and their powers to investigate. The F.I.R. has been defined being an information given to the police which sets criminal law in motion. Setting criminal law into motion means requiring Investigating Agency to take steps towards investigation, make some efforts for investigating the crime. It is mandatory on the part of the Incharge Police Officer of the Police Station to forward the F.I.R. to the concerned Magistrate immediately within whose jurisdiction ordinarily the offence committed. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had got mandatory link with the provision of Section 177 and 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that if any F.I.R. is lodged with the police, it must be dispatched to the concerned Magistrate immediately having jurisdiction to try the offence.
11. In the instant case, I find that since no part of the occurrence took place within the jurisdiction of Chandwa Police Station or within the territorial jurisdiction of the C.J.M. at Chandwa. The institution of F.I.R. at Chandwa Police Station was unwarranted, uncalled for as no cognizance of the offence would be taken allegedly committed beyond territorial jurisdiction of the Courts at Chandwa. In a similar situation a single Bench of the Delhi High Court in Amit Sharma Vrs. State and Ors. arising out of Cr.Misc. No.722 of 2009 by placing reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court, reported in Lalita Kumari V. Govt. of U.P. & Ors. in Writ Petition(Cri.) No.68 of 2008 decided on 14th July, 2008 allowed the petition and quashed the F.I.R. I find that the instant case is also similarly situated wherein the F.I.R. was entertained by Chandwa Police in spite of knowing the facts that no part of the occurrence took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Latehar and if at all the F.I.R. or any other petition is filed, the same is liable to be quashed as being barred by jurisdiction. For the reasons stated above the F.I.R. of Chandwa P.S. Case No.90 of 2006 lodged against the petitioners as also their criminal proceeding arising out of such case are hereby quashed, however, this order will not come into way or preclude the O.P.No.2 in filing a fresh case before appropriate court/police station having jurisdiction to entertain. Both the petitions are allowed.
9) Nagar Chandra mahato vs state of Jharkhand
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.708 of 2008
1. Unnoti Mahto, Wife of Sri Sunil Kumar Mahto.
2. Sunil Kumar Mahto, S/o Nagar Chandra Mahto.
Both at present resident of Loko Para, S.E. Railway Quarter No.
E-13/A at Purulia, P.O. Namo Para, P.S. Purulia, District-Purulia,
West Bengal.
.........Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Smt. Sabitri Devi, D/o Kalicharan Mahto, Resident of Village-
Pradhan Khanta ( Paharchar), P.O. Pradhan Khanta, P.S.
Baliapur, District-Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
......Opposite Parties
With
Cr.M.P. No. 589 of 2008
1. Nagar Chandra Mahto @ Nagar Mahato, Son of late Motilal
Mahato, (Father in law.
2. Niru Devi, W/o Nagar Chandra Mahto @ Nagar Mahto ( Mother
in law).
3. Anil Kumar Mahato, Son of Nagar Chandra Mahato( Brother in
law).
4. Pratima Devi @ Pratima Mahato, Wife of Anil Kumar Mahato.
All resident of village-Chamrubera, P.O. Pethajori, P.S. Purulia,
District-Purulia ( West Bengal).
.....Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Smt. Sabitri Devi, D/o Kalicharan Mahto, Resident of Village-
Pradhan Khanta (Paharchar), P.O. Pradhan Khanta, P.S.
Baliapur, District-Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
....Opposite Parties
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Coram: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Saibal Mitra, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Hardeo Prasad Singh, APP
For O.P. No. 2 : None
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11/.18.04.2016
In these applications, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding in connection with C.P. Case No. 1849 of 2006 including the order dated 8.8.2007, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, whereby and whereunder cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable under sections 498A/34 and Section 494 of the Indian penal Code.
2. A complaint case was instituted being C.P. Case No. 1849 of 2006, in which it was alleged that the complainant is the legally married wife of accused no. 1 and their marriage was solemnized in the year 1989 according to Hindu Rites & Customs. It has been submitted that after the marriage, all the accused persons started torturing the complainant for not fulfilling the demand of a Hero Honda Motorcycle. It is alleged that the accused persons had driven her out from the matrimonial house in the year 2005 and on 24.10.2006, the accused persons had assaulted the complainant and were planning to burn her but somehow she managed to run and reach her parental house.
3. Upon conducting an enquiry under section 202 Cr.P.C. by examining the complainant and her witness, cognizance was taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate for the offence under sections 498A/34 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code.
4. Heard Mr. Saibal Mitra, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Hardeo Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the State. No one appears for O.P. No. 2.
5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioner no. 1 and petitioner no. 2 in Cr.M.P. No. 708 of 2008 are the second wife as well as the husband of the complainant, whereas the petitioner no. 1 and 2 in Cr.M.P. No. 589 of 2008 are the parents in law, petitioner no. 3 is the brother in law and petitioner no. 4 is the sister in law of the complainant.
6. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the entire allegations are said to have taken place in West Bengal, which has been admitted by the complainant on S.A. and such circumstance do point to malicious prosecution foisted upon the petitioners. It has been submitted that the only incident, which had taken place in Dhanbad, is of an allegation of assault by the husband of the complainant but the same also does not reveal any offence under section 498A of the IPC and at best it can be a case under section 323 IPC but no cognizance has been taken under the said section. Learned counsel further submits that the occurrence as per the own version of the complainant is said to have taken place ten years back when the petitioner no. 2 in Cr.M.P. No. 708 of 2008 had solemnized second marriage with the petitioner no. 1. It has, therefore, been submitted that considering the entire facts of the case, the criminal proceeding against the petitioners deserves to be quashed and set aside.
7. From perusal of the complaint petition, it is apparent that though the parental house of the complainant is situated in the district of Dhanbad but the entire incident as alleged had taken place in the district of Purulia. The complainant in course of her examination on S.A. had categorically stated on a court question that the petitioner no. 2 in Cr.M.P. No. 708 of 2008 had solemnized marriage with the petitioner no. 1 ten years prior to the institution of the case and the incidents are said to have taken place in the State of West Bengal. Although a passing reference has been made about the assault committed upon the complainant by the husband for taking ‘bidai’ of the complainant but nothing has been stated that there was any allegation of demand of dowry, which was made at Dhanbad or that the assault was made on account of such non fulfillment of demand of dowry. It thus appears that allegations of demand of Hero Honda Motorcycle and the assault inflicted upon the complainant is confined to the State of West Bengal and in view of such factual position, no criminal case can proceed for the offence under section 498A/494 of the Indian Penal Code.
8. With respect to the question of territorial jurisdiction, as has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, reference may be made to the case of Amrendra Jyoti and Ors. Vs. State of Chhatisgarh & Ors, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 362, wherein it was held as follows:-
“11. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do not agree with the High Court that in this case the mental cruelty inflicted upon Respondent 2 “continued unabated” on account of no effort having been made by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and the threats given by the appellants over the telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High Court does not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding the threats said to have been given by the appellants over the telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we are of the view that it cannot be held that the Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate Court at Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed”.
It thus appears that even if it is assumed that the petitioners had indeed assaulted and tortured on account of non fulfillment of dowry in the State of West Bengal, the same cannot be said to be a continuing offence so as to include Dhanbad within the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. Apart from the question of territorial jurisdiction having been decided in favour of the petitioners, the allegation also seems to have been made belatedly.
Considering what has been stated above, there being merit in these applications, the same is allowed and the entire criminal proceeding in connection with C.P. Case No. 1849 of 2006 including the order dated 8.8.2007, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, whereby and whereunder cognizance has been taken for the offence under sections 498A/34and Section 494 of the Indian penal Code is quashed and set aside.
(Rongon Mukhopadhyay,J) Rakesh/
10)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 1985 of 2013
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1. Devendra Kumar @ Pawan Kumar Pandey, Son of Bal Krishna
Pandey.
2. Bal Krishna Pandey, Son of Sri Chandrika Pandey.
3. Jayanti Devi @ Jaymanti Devi, Wife of Bal Krishna Pandey.
4. Sunita Mishra, daughter of Bal Krishna Pandey and wife of Sri
Ramesh Kumar Mishra, resident of Anandpuri Colony,P.S. Sadar,
P.O.& District-Hazaribagh.
5. Satyanarayan Pandey, Son of Bal Krishna Pandey, SL. Nos. 1, 2,
3 and 5 all are residents of Kundu Bungalow Road, Near
Electricity Officer, Madhupur,P.O. & P.S. Madhupur, District-
Deoghar.
.....Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Anjali Devi, Wife of Devendra Kumar @ Pawan Kumar Pandey
and daughter of late Diwakar Pandey, resident of Kundu
Bungalow Road, near Electricity Officer, Madhupur, P.O. & P.S.
Madhupur, District-Deoghar, at present residing at Korrah, Jabra
Road, New Colony, P.S. Sadar, P.O. & District-Hazaribagh.
....Opposite Parties
-----
Coram: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY
-----
For the Petitioners : Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, Advocate
For the State : APP
For the O.P. No. 2 : Mr. H.K. Shikarwar, Advocate
-----
C.A.V. On 17.12.2014 Pronounced on_11/3/2015
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
In this application, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the
entire criminal proceeding in connection with Complaint Case No.563
of 2013, including the order dated 18.05.2013, passed by learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh, whereby and whereunder
cognizance has been taken for the offences punishable under section
498A/307 of the Indian Penal Code.
The prosecution story as would appear from the complaint
petition lodged by the complainant-opposite party no. 2 is that the
complainant was married with the petitioner no. 1 on 17.05.2006 and
after marriage, she went to her matrimonial house at Madhupur in
the district of Deoghar and lived happily as husband and wife for
three months. It has been alleged that subsequently the demand of
dowry started. On instigation of the accused persons, the
complainant was assaulted. It has further been alleged that on
20.08.2006
, the petitioner no. 1 had abused the complainant and assaulted her resulting in termination of her pregnancy. Thereafter, it has been alleged that in spite of torture meted out to her, thecomplainant tried to adjust but assault continued and in fact in May, 2009, the accused persons tried to kill her by setting her on fire. It has also been alleged that on 4.11.2007, the complainant gave birth to a girl child and assault and torture did not stop and the complainant suffered serious injuries when the motorcycle, which was being driven by the petitioner no. 1 deliberately dashed with another vehicle and the complainant and her child fell down from the motorcycle. It has been alleged that on 10th April, 2012, the complainant came back to her matrimonial house where she somehow managed to stay for 3-4 months in spite of abuse directed at her.
After conducting an inquiry by examining the complainant on solemn affirmation as well as her witnesses, cognizance was taken on 18.05.2013 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh for the offences punishable under sections 498A/307 of the Indian Penal Code.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the entire allegations directed against the petitioners are false and concocted and in fact even from the own admission of the complainant-opposite party no. 2, the entire allegations, which have been made, have taken place in the district of Deoghar and no part of the occurrence has occurred in the district of Hazaribagh and as such the entire criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh to take cognizance. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in fact the complainant was having a love affair with one Manish Pandey from before and she had left her matrimonial house and was residing with the said Manish Pandey and on complaint being made by the petitioner no. 1, Hisua P.S. Case no. 76 of 2012 was instituted. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the complainant had filed a divorce case on 22.12.2012 being Divorce Case No. 314 of 2012, which, however, was subsequently withdrawn vide order dated 5.2.2013. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that petitioner no. 1 had subsequently instituted a divorce suit being Divorce Suit No. 41 of 2013 before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Nawadah under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act and on 2.3.2013, notices were issued to the respondent (complainant) and immediately thereafter the complaint petition was filed. He, therefore, submits that the surrounding facts reveal that only in order to satisfy her grudge against her inlaws, the complaint case was instituted, which is a mala fide action on the part of the complainant-opposite party no. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon the judgments in the case of Dhananjay Singh & Ors Vs. State of Jharkhand & Another, reported in 2010 3 JLJR 378, Arjun Vs. State of Jharkhand, reported in 2006 1 JCR 183 (Jhr) and Sushila Agarwal and another Vs State of Jharkhand & another, reported in 2010 (4) JLJR 38.
Learned counsel for Opposite Party no. 2, on the other hand, has submitted that even though the torture is said to have been levelled in the district of Deoghar but on account of the fact that the complainant is residing in her parental house situated within the district of Hazaribagh and she is suffering from mental cruelty, which is a consequence of the act of turning her out from her matrimonial house and therefore the same being a continuing offence, the learned court at Hazaribagh has the jurisdiction to try the offence. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 that specific allegations have been levelled against the petitioners and on proper appreciation of the averments made in the complaint petition as well as the witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant, cognizance has been taken for the offences punishable under sections 498A and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and in such circumstances when admittedly a case has been made out by the complainant-opposite party no. 2, no interference is warranted in the said criminal proceedings.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records, I find that the allegations, which have been levelled by the complainant, relate to her matrimonial house, which is situated in the district of Deoghar. The petitioner had filed a suit for dissolution of the marriage being Divorce Suit No. 41 of 2013, in which notices were issued on 2.3.2013 upon the complainant- opposite party no. 2 and thereafter on 23.03.2013, the complaint case was lodged by the complainant-opposite party no. 2. It has been strenuously argued by learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 that since offence is a continuing one, which still continues as the complainant-opposite party no. 2 is residing at her parental house in the district of Hazaribagh but the said contention of the complainant- opposite party no. 2 is devoid of any merit in view of the fact that Sections 178 and 179 of the Indian Penal Code do not include an offence of cruelty as contemplated under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code to be a continuing offence. Nothing has been averred in the complaint petition to substantiate the fact that the offence is a continuing one and merely by asserting that on account of being turned out from her matrimonial house, the mental cruelty continues and therefore jurisdiction can be in the district of Hazaribagh is no ground to conclude that the learned court at Hazaribagh had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
In the case of Dhananjay Singh & Ors Vs. State of Jharkhand & Another, reported in 2010 3 JLJR 378, the entire criminal proceedings were quashed since the transaction relating to alleged cruelty was confined to the period when the complainant was living in her matrimonial house at Patna and no part of the alleged conduct was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Dhanbad Court. In this context, reference may also be made to the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Amarendu Jyoti & Ors. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., reported in 2015 (1) East Cr C 231 (SC), wherein it was held as follows:-
“8. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do not agree with the High Court that in this case the mental cruelty inflicted upon the respondent no. 2 “continued unabated” on account of no effort having been made by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and the threats given by the appellants over the telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High Court does not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding the threats said to have been given by the appellants over the telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we are of the view that it cannot be held that the Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate Court at Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.”
Thus in view of the fact that the entire allegations with respect to commission of the alleged offence has been conducted in the district of Deoghar and no part of the said offence having been alleged to have taken place in the district of Hazaribagh and in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the complaint case instituted by the complainant-opposite party no. 2 cannot be allowed to continue at Hazaribagh as the learned court at Hazaribagh lacks the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. The judgment in the case of Sushila Agarwal and another Vs State of Jharkhand & another, reported in 2010 4 JLJR 38 is also with respect to territorial jurisdiction and the ratio of the said judgment is similar to the one, which has been discussed above and as such no detailed discussion with reference to the same is necessary. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also referred to the case of Arjun Vs. State of Jharkhand, reported in 2006 1 JCR 183 (Jhr), in which it was held that where complaint case has been filed as a counter blast to matrimonial case filed by the petitioners seeking divorce, it was actuated with mala fide intention and order taking cognizance is liable to be quashed. By citing the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that on issuance of notice in the suit filed by the petitioner no. 1 for dissolution of marriage, the complaint case was instituted. At this stage, it cannot be deciphered as to whether the complaint case was a counter blast to the matrimonial suit and the said issue is best left open at this stage. So far as the allegations with respect to Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the same has been mentioned at paragraph 20 of the complaint petition of an incident which occurred on 5.11.2011 relating to an accident with another vehicle. The said allegations on the face of it seem to be highly absurd and improbable inasmuch as if the petitioner no. 1 had the intention as highlighted by the complainant-opposite party no. 2, he was himself at a greater risk to suffer serious injuries, if he had dashed deliberately with his motorcycle with another vehicle. Even otherwise, the said incident had also taken place in the year 2011 whereas the complaint case has been instituted in 2013 and there being no plausible explanation with respect to the lodgment of the case after such a delay, the same appears to be coloured with ill-motive and ill-intention. In such circumstances also, the criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed.
Accordingly, this application is allowed and the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Complaint Case No.563 of 2013, including the order dated 18.05.2013, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh, whereby and whereunder cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable under section 498A/307 of the Indian Penal Code, is hereby quashed.
11) Sabita Devi Vs state of Jharkhand
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
Cr. M. P. No. 369 of 2007
Sabita Devi ..... Petitioner(s)
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. .... Opp. Party(s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. R. PRASAD
For the Petitioner(s) : M/s Ashish Jha, N. Ishrat, Advocate.
For the State : A.P.P.
For the Opp. Party(s) : M/s Sree P. Jha, A. Prakash, Advocates.
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08 /3.04.2012
. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the Opposite party No.2.
This application is directed against the order dated 23.02.2007, passed in Criminal Revision No.42 of 2006, whereby and whereunder, the learned Sessions Judge, Dumka, having come to the conclusion that no cause of action has ever accrued at Dumka, set aside the order under which cognizance had been taken by learned C.J.M., Dumka, against the petitioner in P.C.R. Case No.296 of 2006, under Sections 498A and 323 of the Indian Penal Code.
A complaint was lodged by the petitioner before the learned C.J.M., Dumka, alleging therein that after getting married to Rudra Prasad Singh came to her in-law’s place at Bhagalpur, where the accused persons started subjecting her to torture on account of non-fulfillment of the demand of dowry. In course of time, she along with her daughter was taken to her parents’ house by her husband.
Further case is that when her husband fell ill, he was taken to Patna for the treatment where, the complainant came along with her father and started looking after her husband, but as her husband was suffering from Cancer, he died. Thereupon the members of the in-law’s family started putting blame upon the complainant that she has been proved to be unlucky for her husband. The other day, the accused persons assaulted her in a room and then on 4.6.2006, she was driven out of house after snatching from her the ornaments which had been given in the marriage.
On such allegation, a complaint was lodged at Dumka. When cognizance was taken, the accused persons challenged it before the learned Sessions Judge, Dumka, who having found that no cause of action has ever accrued at Dumka, the court at Dumka has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. Accordingly, the order taking cognizance was set aside. Being aggrieved with that order, this application has been filed.
Learned counsel by referring to a decision rendered in a case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. {2011 (11) SCC 301, submits that offence, under Section 498A being a continuing offence, can be lodged even at a place, where consequence got accrued. Since the complainant on being driven out of the house, came to Dumka at her parents house, she certainly suffered mental torture and as such, the court at Dumka had every territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under Sections 498A and 323 of the I.P.C and in that view of the matter, the learned Sessions Judge certainly committed error by quashing the order taking cognizance.
It be stated that in case of Bhura Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan {2008 (11) SCC 103} and also in a case of Y. Abraham Ajith Vs. Inspector of Police {2004 (8) SCC 100}, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the court in whose local jurisdiction, offence gets committed does have jurisdiction to take cognizance and that the court will have no jurisdiction, where no part of offence was committed. Subsequently, Their Lordship, in a case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap Vs. State of Bihar and Anr., in the facts of the case, were pleased to hold that episode at Gaya is only a consequence of continuing offence of harassment and illegal treatment meted out to the complainant. The detail which has been observed at Para-18 in the case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap (supra) is as follows :-
18. We have already adverted to the details made by the appellant in the complaint. In view of the specific assertion by the appellant wife about the ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of the husband and his relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that because of their action, she was taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire consequence for not fulfilling their demand of dowry, we hold that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code, the offence in this case was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted therein. In other words, as the offence was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was only a consequence of continuing offence of harassment and ill- treatment meted out to the complainant, clause (c ) of Section 178 is attracted. Further, from the allegations in the complaint, it appears to us that it is a continuing offence of ill-treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant at the hands of all the accused persons and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all had taken part and on other occasions one of the accused, namely, the husband had taken part, therefore, undoubtedly clause (c ) of Section 178 of the Code is clearly attracted.
Thus, the facts which were there in the case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap is that though torture was inflicted at Ranchi, but at one point of time, the husband had taken her parental house at Gaya where threat of dire consequence for not fulfilling their demand of dowry was extended and, therefore, Their Lordship did find that consequence in terms of Sub-Clause (c ) of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code fell at Gaya and, therefore, it was held that the court at Gaya does have jurisdiction to proceed with the case.
Here in the instant case, as has been found earlier that no cause of action has ever accrued at Dumka and as such, the court at Dumka had absolutely no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, as alleged.
Under the circumstances, I do not find any illegality in the order and accordingly, it is affirmed.
However, the petitioner would be at liberty to invoke the provision as contained in Section 201 of the Cr.P.C. by approaching the court to get the complaint returned for presentation to the proper court with an endorsement to that effect. If a resort is made to that provision, necessary order be passed.
With the aforesaid observations, this application stands disposed of.
12) Arun Sharma vs State of Jharkhand
In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi
Cr. M. P. No.661 of 2010
Arun Sharma and others ...................................Petitioners
VERSUS
State of Jharkhand and another ...............Opposite Parties
CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE R.R.PRASAD
For the Petitioners: Mr.R.K.Singh
For the State : A.P.P
For the Opp.Party no.2:
3/ 05.07.2012
. This application is directed against the order dated 21.8.2009 passed in P.C.R case no.240 of 2009 whereby and whereunder learned Magistrate having found prima facie case being made out under Sections 498A, 379/149 of the Indian Penal Code has issued summons against the petitioners under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said order taking cognizance is being sought to be quashed on the ground that the court which has taken cognizance of the offences as aforesaid lacks territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action ever accrued at the place where the complaint was lodged.
As against this, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.2 submits that one of the allegations does relate to the place to which the court which has taken cognizance does have territorial jurisdiction and hence, the order taking cognizance never warrants to be quashed.
In the context of the submission, the case of the complainant as has been made out in the complaint needs to be taken notice of .
It is the case of the complainant-opposite party no.2 that the complainant having married Shravan Kumar Sharma started living at her in-laws’ place at village Bandraha, Uttar Pradesh. Unfortunately, husband of the complainant died on 28.1.2009. Thereupon the accused persons started behaving with the complainant in such manner that the complainant should leave the house but when the complainant did not leave the place, the accused persons started abusing and subjecting her to torture. The accused persons even stopped giving food to her and at one point of time even made an attempt on the life of the complainant.
Further case of the complainant is that after coming to know all about this, when her brother came to Bandraha, he was abused and assaulted when he tried to mediate the things.Not only that the accused persons drove him as well as this complainant out of the house. Thereafter Panchayati took place at Yognidhan but in that course also the accused persons assaulted the complainant and his relative. On such allegation, complaint was lodged as P.C.R.case no.240 of 2009, upon which cognizance of the offence was taken under Sections 498A and 379/149 of the Indian Penal Code.
Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, it does appear that the prosecution is being challenged before this Court on the ground that cause of action for alleged offences under which cognizance has been taken has never accrued at any place falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which has taken cognizance of the offences.
At this stage, I may refer to a decision rendered in a case of Bhura Ram vs. State of Rajasthan[(2008) 11 SCC 103] and also in a case of Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police [(2004) 8 SCC 100] where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the cause of action having arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, where the offence was committed, could not be tried by the court where no part of offence was committed.
Here, as I have stated earlier that no cause of action has ever accrued at Godda and as such, the court of Gooda has absolutely no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence as alleged.
Under the circumstances, entire criminal proceeding of P.C.R Case no.240 of 2009 including the order taking cognizance dated 21.8.2009 is hereby quashed.
However, the opposite party no.2 would be at liberty to invoke the provision as contained in Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for approaching the court to get the complaint returned for presentation to the proper court with an endorsement to that effect. If resort is made to that provision, necessary order be passed.
With the aforesaid observations, this application stands disposed of.
13) Radhe Raman Naik vs state of Jharkhand
ORDER Amareshwar Sahay, J.
1. It is stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that during the pendency of this application, petitioner No. 1 has died and as such, the name of petitioner No. 1 be deleted from the cause title of this case. Accordingly, the name of petitioner No. 1 is deleted.
2. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
3. Despite the personal service of notice, opposite party No. 2 Usha Devi has not chosen to appear to contest the case.
4. The prayer in this application is to quash the order dated 19-2-2003 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro, in C.P. Case No. 341 of 2002, whereby the cognizance of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was taken ‘ against the accused persons including the petitioner.
5. The main grievance of the petitioner for challenging the order dated 19-2-2003 taking cognizance and for quashing the entire criminal prosecution/proceedings is that even according to the allegation made in the complaint petition, no part of the occurrence alleged has taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of Bokaro Court and, therefore, the Court at Bokaro had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and proceed with the trial since the alleged occurrence took place outside of its territorial jurisdiction.
6. It is submitted that even according to the complaint petition the occurrence has taken place in the State of Uttar Pradesh, and, therefore, in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police Chennai and Anr. , the criminal prosecution/proceedings cannot continue in the Court at Bokaro.
7. In order to test the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, I have gone through the complaint petition; a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-1 to this application, and found that the complainant herself has stated that the place of occurrence was at her matrimonial house situated at village Bakhira, P.O. and P.S. Bakhira, Paragana Maghar (East) Tahsil Khalilabad, district St. Kabir Nagar, U.P.
8. From the perusal of the entire complaint petition as well as the statement of the complainant recorded on solemn affirmation and the statements of the witnesses recorded during the course of enquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is evident that the overt act as alleged against the petitioner is said to have been taken place in the State of Uttar Pradesh at village Bakhira and not at Bokaro in the State of Jharkhand.
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 42.86 (supra) considered the similar facts as of the instant case and after considering the provisions of Sections 177 and 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, held that “the criminal proceeding pending before the Magistrate at ‘C’ had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter the occurrence of which took place at place ‘N'”. Therefore, the present case is fully covered by the above decision of the Supreme Court.
14) Sraban Kumar Agarwala vs State of Jharkhand
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. M. P. No.223 of 2007
Sraban Kumar Agarwala & Ors. ......Petitioners.
-Versus-
The State of Jharkhand & Anr. .......Opposite Parties.
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NARENDRA NATH TIWARI
------
For the Petitioners : Mr. T. R. Bajaj, Sr. Advocate.
For the State : A.P.P.
For O.P. No.2 : Mr. R. S. Mazumdar, Advocate.
------
11/12.08.2009
: In this petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 22nd May, 2006 passed by learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, Sahibganj in P.C.R. Case no.127 of 2006, whereby cognizance of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code has been taken against the petitioners.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the impugned order on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction of the court below. It has been submitted that from the plain reading of the complaint petition it is evident that the entire allegations are related to the place at Murshidabad in the State of West Bengal. There is no allegation of commission of any act within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned court below. It has been submitted that in the case of Bhura Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in AIR 2008 SC 2666, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in a complaint under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code if the alleged acts were of the place falling within another State, a complaint cannot be entertained in the court of another State. In the said case, the complaint was related to the place, falling within the State of Punjab, while the complaint case under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was filed in the State of Rajasthan. The Supreme Court has held that since no cause of action arose in the State of Rajasthan, the Court of that State had no jurisdiction to deal with the said case.
3. Mr. T. R. Bajaj, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that in the instant case, all the alleged acts are of the place at Murshidabad in the State of West Bengal and there is no allegation of commission of any act or any act, constituting offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, at the place within State of Jharkhand and as such learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, Sahibganj has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. The impugned order is, thus, without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed.
4. Mr. R. S. Mazumdar, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the complainant-Opposite Party no.2, has not disputed the said legal position. He has fairly accepted that the case is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhura Ram & Ors. (Supra), as the allegations do not show any cause of action arising in the State of Jharkhand.
5. In view of the above admitted legal and factual position, this petition is allowed. The order taking cognizance dated 22nd May, 2006 passed by learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, Sahibganj in P.C.R. Case no.127 of 2006 is quashed.
6. It is made clear that this order shall not in any way impede the complainant-Opposite Party no.2 to file any such complaint in the court of competent jurisdiction.
(Narendra Nath Tiwari, J.) Sanjay/
10. In this view of the matter this application is allowed and the order-taking cognizance dated 19-2-2003 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro, in C.P. Case No. 341 of 2002 as well as the entire criminal prosecution/proceedings of the petitioner for the offence under Sections 498A of the Indian Penal Code and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act pending in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro, is hereby quashed.
15) Prashanth Kumar Tripathi vs State of Jharkhand
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 1329 of 2013
-----------
1. Prashant Kumar Tripathy @ Prashant Kumar, Son of late Laxmanji Tripathi.
2. Sarita Tripathi, Wife of Sri Ramji Tripathi, Both resident of village-Mauna Banganj, P.O. P.S. Chapra, Town- District-Saran (Bihar).
…..Petitioners Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Kusum Devi, Wife of Prashant Kumar Tripathi, D/o late Shyamala Pandey, at present residing at Mohalla-Janak Nagar, Near Old Gas Godown-P.O. & P.S. Pandra, O.P., District-Ranchi.
…..Opposite Parties
—
Coram: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY
—–
For the Petitioners : Mr. J.S. Singh, Advocate
For the State : APP
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C.A.V. On 10.02.2015 Pronounced on_13/7/2015
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
In this application, the petitioners have prayed for quashing
the entire criminal proceedings in connection with complaint case no. 1388 of 2011, including the order dated 17.10.2012 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable under sections 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The prosecution story arising out of the complaint case filed by the O.P. No. 2 in brief is that the complainant was married to the accused no. 1 (petitioner no. 1) on 6.12.2008 as per Hindu rites and custom at Chhapra in the State of Bihar. It has been alleged that at the time of marriage, several articles including Rs.2 lac in cash was given to her inlaws. After the marriage, the complainant arrived at her matrimonial home at Chhapra, where after some time for insufficient dowry, she was started being tortured mentally. It has been alleged that the husband of the complainant assaulted her and pressure was created upon her to bring Rs. 2 lacs as dowry and on refusal, torture was meted out to her. It has also been alleged in the complaint petition that brother of the complainant came to Chhapra and took the complainant to Ranchi on 17.04.2009, where she remained for about one year but neither the accused persons took her back nor they spoke to her. On the assurance of the accused persons, the brother of the complainant brought the complainant to Chhapra in April, 2010 but after 15 days, torture again started, wherein the brother of the complainant again brought the complainant to Ranchi on 12.05.2010 from her matrimonial home, where the complainant had been treated. It has been alleged that the complaint was lodged at Pandra O.P., wherein a bond was executed by the husband (petitioner no.1) and he took the complainant back to Chhapra, where the husband started living separately in a rented house but even then after some time the demand of dowry started and on account of assault for non fulfillment of the demand of dowry, she was forced to leave her matrimonial house.
After an inquiry was conducted under section 202 Cr.P.C. by examining the complainant on solemn affirmation as well as her witnesses, cognizance was taken for the offence punishable under section 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi, vide order dated 17.10.2012.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted at the outset that the entire allegations made in the complaint petition are false and concocted and that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi did not have the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code as the complaint petition discloses that the entire allegations of demand of dowry and torture meted out to the complainant was at Chhapra and there being no cause of action at Ranchi, the entire criminal proceeding deserves to be quashed on that ground itself. To substantiate his argument, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that even the complainant on solemn affirmation has not stated about the cause of action, which had accrued in the District of Ranchi and similar is the statement of her witnesses. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also submitted that on 13.05.2010, an application was filed by the petitioner no. 1 against the complainant- O.P. No. 2 under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. It has been submitted that in the counter affidavit filed by the opposite party no. 2 and in the P.R. Bond which has been executed by the petitioner no. 1, there is no mention of any torture or any demand of dowry. Continuing with his argument, learned counsel for the petitioners states that after the application under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed by the petitioner no. 1, the present complaint has been filed on 25.08.2011 by way of a counter blast and on such score also, the entire criminal proceeding against the petitioners deserves to be quashed.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has also referred to the judgments reported in the case of Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 435 and in the case of National Bank of Oman Vs. Barakara Abdul Aziz and Another, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 488.
Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2, on the other hand, while placing reliance on the counter affidavit filed by her, has submitted that specific allegations have been levelled against the petitioners of demand of dowry and torture and in such circumstances the petitioners do not have any case so as to warrant any interference by this Court. It has been submitted that in the complaint petition itself, the allegations have been made at paragraphs 25 & 27, which would indicate that PR Bond was executed by the petitioner no. 1 in the district of Ranchi, pursuant to which, the complainant was taken back to her matrimonial house at Chhapra and that the complainant was also assaulted and she was left at Ranchi and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that territorial jurisdiction lies only in the district of Chhapra and not in the district of Ranchi. It has further been submitted that intention of the petitioners would be evident from the fact that on 12.05.2010, she was thrown out from her matrimonial house, whereas on 13.05.2010, the application under section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act was filed by the petitioner no. 1 and thereafter also, the PR Bond was executed by the petitioner no. 1 on 04.06.2010 and in such circumstances, the conduct of petitioner no. 1 is also to be looked into.
Learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 has also relied upon the judgments in the case of Sumanta Seth Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors, reported in 2012 3 East Cr.C.447(Jhr), Sunit Kumar Kashyap Vs. State of Bihar & Anr, reported in 2011 2 East Cr.C. 217(SC), Smt. Sujata Mukherjee Vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1997 SC 2465 and in the case of Jagdish Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in AIR 2004 SC 1734.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records, I find that sole thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the entire allegations of torture and demand of dowry have taken place in the district of Chhapra and since no cause of action had arisen in the district of Ranchi, in such circumstances, the Court at Ranchi is precluded from taking cognizance in view of apparent bar on account of territorial jurisdiction. The complaint petition basically revolves around the incident of torture, which had been carried out in Chhapra. So far as paragraphs 25 & 27 of the complaint petition is concerned, upon which, much reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2, the same seems to be with respect to PR Bond executed by the petitioner no. 1 in Pandra O.P. on 4.6.2010 giving an undertaking that in future no cause of complaint will occur. It further appears from the said paragraphs that the complainant was assaulted and thereafter she was taken to her parental house at Ranchi. Both the acts do not disclose that the torture and the demand of dowry were meted out to the complainant at Ranchi. The undertaking given by the petitioner no. 1 by way of P.R. Bond was as a consequence of the complaint made by the complainant before the Pandra O.P., to which the petitioner no. 1 had given the undertaking that no such happenings will be committed in future. Such undertaking would not mean that the cause of action accrued at Ranchi. So far the averments made by the complainant in paragraph 27 of the complaint petition is concerned to the effect that she was assaulted and thereafter she was left at her parental house at Ranchi does not also denote that the cause of action was at Ranchi for institution of the case. The allegations made with respect to paragraphs 25 and 27 of the complaint cannot be said to be as a consequence of the acts alleged against the petitioners at Chhapra so as to include the Court at Ranchi to be within the territorial jurisdiction.
In the case of Udai Shankar Awasthi (supra), while considering the amended provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C. where the accused resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned, it was held as follows:-
40. The Magistrate had issued summons without meeting the mandatory requirement of Section 202 CrPC, though the appellants were outside his territorial jurisdiction. The provisions of Section 202 CrPC were amended vide the Amendment Act, 2005, making it mandatory to postpone the issue of process where the accused resides in an area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned. The same was found necessary in order to protect innocent persons from being harassed by unscrupulous persons and making it obligatory upon the Magistrate to enquire into the case himself, or to direct investigation to be made by a police officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of finding out whether or not, there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused before issuing summons in such cases. (See also Shivjee Singh v. Nagendra Tiwary, SCC p. 584, para 11 and National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz.) In the case of National Bank of Oman (supra), similar question fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was held as follows:-
8. We find no error in the view taken by the High Court that the CJM, Ahmednagar had not carried out any enquiry or ordered investigation as contemplated under Section 202 CrPC before issuing the process, considering the fact that the respondent is a resident of District Dakshin Kannada, which does not fall within the jurisdiction of the CJM, Ahmednagar. It was, therefore, incumbent upon him to carry out an enquiry or order investigation as contemplated under Section 202CrPC before issuing the process.
9. The duty of a Magistrate receiving a complaint is set out in Section 202 CrPC and there is an obligation on the Magistrate to find out if there is any matter which calls for investigation by a criminal court. The scope of enquiry under this section is restricted only to find out the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint in order to determine whether process has to be issued or not. Investigation under Section 202 CrPC is different from the investigation contemplated in Section 156 as it is only for holding the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 CrPC is, therefore, limited to the ascertainment of truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint:
(i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the court;
(ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and
(iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have.
In the case of Sumanta Seth (supra), it was held that the offence committed under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is a continuous offence and the Court in whose jurisdiction part of the cause of action arises would have jurisdiction to entertain the case.
In the case of Sunit Kumar Kashyap ( supra), it was held that in view of sections 178 and 179of the Code, the offence was a continuous one having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate at Gaya had the jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted therein.
In the case of Smt. Sujata Mukherjee (supra), it was held that the maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellants is a continuous offence as on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion one of the respondents had taken part and, therefore, section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted.
In the case of Jagdish Ram (supra), it was held that at the stage of cognizance, the Magistrate had only to decide whether a sufficient ground exists or not for further proceeding in the matter.
By referring to the aforesaid judgments, the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has sought to project that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi had the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance under section 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
Since the basic thrust of argument on behalf of both the sides apart from the contention made by learned counsel for the petitioners with reference to amended provisions of section 202Cr.P.C. is that whether the offence committed by the accused persons do fall within the purview of a continuous offence or not. At this juncture, it would be apt to refer to the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Amarendu Jyoti & Ors. Vs. State of Chhatisgarh & Ors, reported in 2015 (1) East Cr. C 231 (SC), wherein it was held as follows:-
“7. The core question thus is whether the allegations made in the FIR constitute a continuing offence. We find from the FIR that all the incidents alleged by the complainant in respect of the alleged cruelty are said to have occurred at Delhi. The cruel and humiliating words spoken to the second respondent, wife by her husband, elder brother-in-law and elder sister-in- law for bringing less dowry are said to have been uttered at Delhi. Allegedly, arbitrary demands of lakhs of rupees in dowry have been made in Delhi. The incident of beating and dragging Respondent 2 and abusing her in filthy language also are said to have taken place at Delhi. Suffice it to say that all overt acts, which are said to have constituted cruelty have allegedly taken place at Delhi. The allegations as to what has happened at Ambikapur are as follows:
“No purposeful information has been received from the in-laws of Kiran even on contacting on telephone till today. They have been threatened and abused and two years have been elapsed and the in-laws have not shown any interest to call her to her matrimonial home and since then Kiran is making her both ends meet in her parental home. To get rid of the ill-treatment and harassment of the in-laws of Kiran, the complainant is praying for registration of an FIR and request for immediate legal action so that Kiran may get appropriate justice.”
“8. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do not agree with the High Court that in this case the mental cruelty inflicted upon Respondent 2 “continued unabated” on account of no effort having been made by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and the threats given by the appellants over the telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High Court does not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding the threats said to have been given by the appellants over the telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we are of the view that it cannot be held that the Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate Court at Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed”.
Considering the entire facts in its totality, the entire allegations in the complaint petition reveal the alleged acts committed by the petitioners in Chhapra and merely because a PR bond was executed by the petitioner no. 1 in the District of Ranchi, the same act would not come within the purview of an alleged act of torture committed in the District of Ranchi so as to include the Court at Ranchi within the territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, as has been enumerated above, and in view of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Amarendu Jyoti (supra), the subsequent actions on the part of the complainant as a resultant effect of the alleged torture upon her would not come within the zone of the same being a continuous offence. The entire facets of allegations are centered around Chhapra, which has the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. That being the position, this Court is of the view that the initiation of the complaint case in the District of Ranchi and its further continuance do merit interference on the ground of absence of territorial jurisdiction.
Accordingly, I find merit in this application, which is allowed and the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case No. 1388/2011 including the order dated 17.10.2012, passed by learned C.J.M, Ranchi, by which cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable under sections 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code is hereby quashed.
(Rongon Mukhopadhyay,J) Rakesh/
16) Raj Kishori Devi vs State of Jharkhand
Cr. M. P. No. 604 of 2010
An Application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973
1.
Rajkishori Devi @ Smt. Runia Devi, wife of Babu Ram Singh
2. Babu Ram Singh, son of late Utipati Singh
3. Mithilesh Kumar Singh, son of Babu Ram Singh All are residents of at Sarayam, Ward No. 5, Near Women’s College, P.O. & P.S. Gopalganj, District Gopalganj, Bihar ………. Petitioners Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Smt. Gayatri Devi, wife of Mithilesh Kumar Singh, resident of at Bhole Nath Basuriya Colliery, P.O. & P.S. Kusunda, District Dhanbad ………. Opposite Parties PRESENT HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY For the Petitioner : Mr. Pratiush Lala, Advocate For the State : A.P.P.
For the O.P. No. 2 : Mrs. Jashodhara Tripathy
C.A.V. on 2.03.2015 Delivered on 11. 3.2015
___
Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
In this application, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Complaint Case No. 348 of 2004 including the order dated 2.9.2004 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, whereby and whereunder, cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable u/s 498A of the Indian Penal Code(IPC) as also u/s 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (D.P. Act).
A complaint petition was instituted by the complainant/ opposite party No. 2 wherein it was stated that the marriage of the complainant was solemnized with the accused No. 1 (petitioner No. 3) and at the time of marriage several gifts in the form of cash and kind were given to the accused persons. It has been alleged that after sometime the accused persons started demanding Rs. 50,000/- and one Hero Honda Motorcycle and on account of non-fulfillment of the said demand, the complainant was subjected to physical and mental torture. It has also been alleged that when the father and the brother of the complainant tried to meet her the same was refused by the accused persons, which led to lodgement of a complaint before the Lok Adalat at Gopalganj. It has also been alleged that on 19.11.2003, the accused persons had taken all her gold ornaments and had driven her out from the matrimonial home and ultimately the complainant having no alternative filed a complaint case being Complaint Case No. 348 of 2004.
After the complainant was examined on S.A. and her witnesses, the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad was pleased to take cognizance for the offence punishable u/s 498A IPC as also u/s 3/4 of the D.P. Act.
It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the complaint petition specifically reveals that the entire allegations against the accused persons of committing torture upon the complainant on account of non-fulfillment of dowry had taken place in Gopalganj in the State of Bihar and no cause of action has arisen at Dhanbad so as to institute the complaint case at Dhanbad. He therefore submits that in view of the fact that Dhanbad Court does not have any territorial jurisdiction to try the offence as alleged by the complainant, the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad committed an illegality in taking cognizance for the offences punishable u/s 498A IPC as also u/s 3/4 of the D.P. Act. In this context he has referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in the case of Manish Ratan & others v. State of M.P. & another reported in (2007) 1 SCC(Cri) 336 and the case of Amarendu Jyoti & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. reported in [2015(1) East Cr C 231(SC)].
The learned counsel for the State on the other hand has submitted that since the complaint petition itself discloses vagueness about the actual place of occurrence and as such it cannot be said that Dhanbad Court does not have jurisdiction to try the case filed by the complainant. It has also been submitted that at this stage it cannot be verified that as to whether the incident had taken place at Gopalganj or at Dhanbad since on being turned out from her matrimonial home, the complainant started living at Dhanbad and the mental torture being suffered by her due to the actions on the part of the accused persons, the offence can be said to be of a continuous nature and in such circumstances, the Court at Dhanbad does have jurisdiction to entertain the criminal complaint.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records, I find that in the complaint petition, the entire occurrence is alleged to have taken place at Gopalganj and only after the occurrence when she was driven out from the matrimonial home, the complaint case has been instituted at Dhanbad, therefore, in no circumstance from the perusal of the complaint petition it can be deduced that Dhanbad Court had the territorial jurisdiction to try the offence as alleged by the complainant. In the solemn affirmation also, the complainant narrated about the torture meted out to her by the accused persons, but admittedly, the said torture took place in Gopalganj and it has further been admitted by the complainant that on account of being turned out from the matrimonial home on 19.11.2003, she started residing at her parental house. In the case of Amarendu Jyoti & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. reported in [2015(1) East Cr C 231(SC)] while taking into consideration the provisions of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was held as follows:-
“8. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do not agree with the High Court that in this case the mental cruelty inflicted upon the respondent No. 2 “continued unabated” on account of no effort having been made by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and the threats given by the appellants over the telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High Court does not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding the threats said to have been given by the appellants over the telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we are of the view that it cannot be held that the Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate Court at Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.”
Thus, it is a settled law that merely because the complainant had been turned out from her matrimonial home, the mental torture allegedly inflicted upon her cannot be termed as a continuing offence even though she is residing at her parental house as an outcome of the alleged actions on the part of the accused persons. Admittedly, jurisdiction in terms of the allegations made in the complaint petition filed by the complainant/ opposite party No. 2 lies within the Court at Gopalganj as no part of the offence is said to have been taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Dhanbad. In such circumstances, the criminal proceedings at Dhanbad Court cannot be allowed to be continued on the ground of there being no territorial jurisdiction to continue the same.
Accordingly, in view of what has been discussed above, this application is hereby allowed and the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Complaint Case No. 348 of 2004 including the order dated 2.9.2004 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, whereby and whereunder, cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable u/s 498A of the Indian Penal Code as also u/s 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is quashed.
(Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated the 11th, March, 2015 MK/N.A.F.R.
17) Sarda Devi Upadhyay vs State of Jharkhand& Anr
In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranch
Cr.M.P.No.385 of 2008
1.Sharda Devi @ Sharda Devi Upadhyay
2.Smt. Bageshwari Pandey
3.Tarkeshwar Upadahyay
4.Shashi Bhushan Upadhya......................Petitioners
VERSUS
State of Jharkhand and another........Opposite Parties
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.R.PRASAD
For the Petitioners : Mr. Shailesh
For the State :A.P.P
For the O.P.No.2 : Mr.Krishna Shankar
Reserved on 11.4.2012 Delivered on 9.11.2012
7/ 9 .11.12. The entire criminal proceeding of Topchanchi P. S. case
no.182 of 2005 ( G. R. No.4835 of 2005) including the order dated
15.6.2006
under which cognizance of the offences has been taken under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 3/ 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is being sought to be quashed on the ground that the court which has taken cognizance lacks territorial jurisdiction.
Before adverting to the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, the case of the prosecution needs to be taken notice of.
It is the case of the informant that the informant – opposite party no.2 after getting married to Tarkeshwar Upadhyay, petitioner no.3, when came to Burdwan (West Bengal) where her father-in-law was in service to live with them, accused persons started ill-treating her. After staying for some days, she came back to her parents house at Gomo but after one month, when she came to her in-laws’ place, accused persons started putting forth demand of Rs.1 lac and in order to get the demand fulfilled, she was being subjected to torture. After a month, she again came to her parents’ house. After a few days, she was taken again to her in-laws’ place where her mother-in-law and other accused persons again put forth the demand of Rs.1 lac. On the occasion of marriage of the brother of her husband, she came to Bharthai where also she was subjected to assault as demand of Rs.1 lac had not been fulfilled. When maternal uncle of the informant was informed about it, he along with others came there and asked from the father-in-law and mother-in-law as to why they are behaving like that. Upon it, accused persons told them that they can do anything which they wish to do. Thereafter the matter was informed to Siwan Police Station and then the informant came along with her maternal uncle to his house. However, with the intervention of the Officer-in-Charge of Siwan Police Station, father-in-law of the informant took the informant to his house but after few days, they again started subjecting her to torture. When things became quite bad, she came to her parents’ house at Gomo where she fell ill on account of being tortured physically and mentally.
On such allegation, a written report was submitted to the Officer-in- Charge, Gomo Police Station which was forwarded to Topchanchi Police Station where a case was registered as Topchanchi (Hariharpur) P.S case no.182 of 2005 under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 3/ 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
On submission of the charge sheet, cognizance of the offence was taken, vide order dated 15.6.2006 which is under challenge.
Mr. Shailesh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that since no cause of action ever accrued at the place where the case was lodged, the court did commit illegality in taking cognizance of the offence, in view of the decision rendered in a case of Bhura Ram and others vs. State of Rajasthan and another [(2008) 11 SCC 103] and also in a case ofY.Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police [(2004) 8 SCC 100].
As against this, Mr.Krishna Shankar, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.2 submits that it is the case of the informant that when she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty, she came to her parents’ house at Gomo where she fell ill and thereby part of the cause of action can certainly be said to have occurred at Gomo, territorial jurisdiction of which the court does have and as such, order taking cognizance never suffers from any illegality.
It be stated that in a case of Bhura Ram and others vs. State of Rajasthan and another (supra) and also in a case of Y.Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that only that court in whose territorial jurisdiction, the cause of action or part of cause of action has accrued, will have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and therefore, that court in whose territorial jurisdiction cause of action never accrued does not have jurisdiction to try the cases.
Subsequently in a case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap vs. State of Bihar and another [(2011) 11 SCC 301] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court did hold that the court who does have territorial jurisdiction of the place where consequence of offence accrued can very well deal with the matter. The fact of that case appears to be somewhat different from the fact of the aforesaid two cases decided earlier by the Hon’ble Supreme Court which would be evident from paragraph 18 of the decision rendered in a case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap vs. State of Bihar and another (supra)
18. “We have already adverted to the details made by the appellant in the complaint. In view of the specific assertion by the appellant wife about the ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of the husband and his relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that because of their action, she was taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire consequence for not fulfilling their demand of dowry, we hold that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code, the offence in this case was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted therein. In other words, as the offence was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was only a consequence of continuing offence of harassment and ill-treatment meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of Section 178 is attracted. Further, from the allegations in the complaint, it appears to us that it is a continuing offence of ill-treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant at the hands of all the accused persons and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all had taken part and on other occasions one of the accused, namely, the husband had taken part, therefore, undoubtedly clause (c ) of Section 178 of the Code is clearly attracted.”
Thus, the facts which were there in the Sunita Kumari Kashyap was that in that case though torture was inflicted at Ranchi, but at one point of time, the husband took his wife to parental home at Gaya where threat of dire consequence for no fulfilling their demand of dowry was extended and, therefore, Their Lordship did find that consequence in terms of sub-clause (c ) of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code ensued at Gaya and, therefore, the court at Gaya does have jurisdiction to proceed with the case.
Here in the instant case, whatever overt acts constituting offence either under Section 498Aof the Indian Penal Code or under Section 3/ 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act have been alleged to have been committed it has been committed either at Burdwan or at Bharthai, district Siwan whereas the case has been lodged at a place which falls within the jurisdiction of the court at Dhanbad where no part of cause of action seems to have fallen, though allegation is that she fell ill at Gomo on account of being subjected to torture physically and mentally but factum of falling ill never constitute part of the offence either under Section 498of the Indian Penal Code or under Section 3/ 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Thus, it can easily be said that no cause of action ever accrued at Dhanbad and as such, the court at Dhanbad had absolutely no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence as alleged.
Under the circumstances, I do find that the court has committed illegality in taking cognizance of the offences. Accordingly it is set aside.
However, the opposite party no.2 would be at liberty to invoke the provision as contained in Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by approaching the court to get the complaint returned for presentation to the proper court with an endorsement to that effect. If resort is made to that provision, necessary order be passed.
Thus, this application stands allowed.
( R. R. Prasad, J.) ND/
18) Nayeem Hassan & State of Jharkhand
In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi
Cr.M.P.No.1883 of 2013
1. Nayeem Hassan
2. Mukhtar Hassan
3. Razja Hassan
4. Gazi Hassan
5. Razi Hassan
6. Saleha Hassan @ Baby . .......................Petitioners
VERSUS
State of Jharkhand and another............Opposite Parties
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.R.PRASAD
For the Petitioners : Mr. Manoj Tandan and Kumari Rashmi
For the State :A.P.P
For the O.P.No.2 : Mr.N.K.Chatterjee
04/ 18.02.14
. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and also learned counsel appearing for the State as well as learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.2.
This application has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding of Complaint Case no.302 of 2007 including the order dated 13.5.2013 wherein prayer for dropping of the proceeding on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction was rejected.
The case of the complainant is that the marriage in between the complainant and the petitioner no.1 was solemnized at Barkakana according to Muslim Rites and Rituals. After the marriage, she started living at her in- laws’ place at Nayasarai Basti, Ramgarh. There the husband as well as her relatives including father-in-law, mother-in-law and other family members started putting forth the demand of a Car as well as cash of Rs.2,10,000/-. On account of non-fulfillment of demand dowry, she was subjected to assault as well as several kind of torture. The other day she was driven out from the house and was sent to her Khala’s place at Ranchi for bringing dowry. After some days, she was taken to her in-laws’ place but the accused persons again started subjecting her to torture on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry.
On such allegation, a complaint was registered as Complaint Case No.302 of 2007. After holding enquiry, the court took cognizance of the offence under Sections 498A, 323 and 506of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter the petitioners moved to this Court in Cr.M.P.No.1737 of 2007 for quashing of the order taking cognizance on the ground that the court does not have territorial jurisdiction. That application was disposed of directing the petitioners to raise all the grounds before the court below. Accordingly, the petitioners raised the question of territorial jurisdiction before the court below. The court, vide order dated 13.5.2013 did find that the court does have territorial jurisdiction after holding that it is the case of the prosecution that complainant having brutally assaulted by the accused persons was driven out from the house and was sent to her Khala’s place at Ranchi for bringing money and thereby it is a continuing offence.
Being aggrieved with that order, this application has been filed. Mr.Tandan,learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that since no cause of action has ever accrued at the place where the case was lodged, the court did commit illegality in taking cognizance of the offence, in view of the decision rendered in a case of Bhura Ram and others vs. Sate of Rajasthan and another [(2008) 11 SCC 103] and also in a case of Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Polie [(2004) 8 SCC 100].
As against this, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.2 submits that it is the case of the complainant that she was subjected to torture on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry at Barkakana but at one point of time, she was driven out from the house and was sent back to Ranchi for bringing dowry and thereby the court at Ranchi does have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
Learned counsel in support of his submission has referred to a decision rendered in a case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap vs. State of Bihar and another [(2011) 11 SCC 301].
Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, it does appear that whatever overt acts have been alleged to have been committed constituting offence under Sections 498A, 323and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, those overt acts seem to have been committed at Bakakana outside of the jurisdiction of the court at Ranchi.
However, it has also been the case of the complainant that the complainant was assaulted at Barkakana and was driven out of the house so that she may come to Ranchi for bringing dowry. According to learned counsel appearing for the complainant, this gives the cause of action for bringing the complainant at Ranchi.
It be stated that act of assault and driving out the complainant from the house has taken place at Barkakana whereas no allegation seems to be there about any overt act being committed at Ranchi and this fact makes whole of the difference with the fact of the case of Sunita Kumari Kashuap vs.State of Bihar and another (supra)which would appear from paragraph 18 of the said decision which reads as under:
18. “We have already adverted to the details made by the appellant in the complaint. In view of the specific assertion by the appellant wife about the ill- treatment and cruelty at the hands of the husband and his relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that because of their action, she was taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire consequence for not fulfilling their demand of dowry, we hold that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code, the offence in this case was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted therein. In other words, as the offence was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was only a consequence of continuing offence of harassment and ill-treatment meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of Section 178 is attracted. Further, from the allegations in the complaint, it appears to us that it is a continuing offence of ill-treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant at the hands of all the accused persons and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all had taken part and on other occasions one of the accused, namely, the husband had taken part, therefore, undoubtedly clause (c ) of Section 178 of the Code is clearly attracted.”
Thus, the facts which were there in the Sunita Kumari Kashyap’s case are that in that case though torture was inflicted at Ranchi, but at one point of time, the husband took his wife to parental home at Gaya where threat of dire consequence for no fulfilling their demand of dowry was extended and, therefore, Their Lordship did find that consequence in terms of sub-clause (c ) of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code ensued at Gaya and, therefore, the court at Gaya does have jurisdiction to proceed with the case.
Here in the instant case, whatever overt acts constituting offence either under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code or other offences have been alleged to have been committed, it has been committed at Barkakana whereas the case has been lodged at Ranchi where no part of cause of action seems to have fallen and therefore, the complaint at Ranchi cannot be maintained.
Accordingly, I do find that the court has committed illegality in taking cognizance of the offence. Accordingly, it is set aside.
However, the opposite party no.2 would be at liberty to invoke the provision as contained in Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by approaching the court to get the complaint returned for presentation to the proper court with an endorsement to that effect. If resort is made to that provision, necessary order be passed.
Thus, this application stands allowed.
( R. R. Prasad, J.) ND/
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